The international oil market is grappling with a persistent oversupply, driving sustained downward pressure on prices. By 2025, global energy systems are operating with significant overcapacity. OPEC+, aiming to regain market share, agreed in July to raise output by 548,000 barrels per day (bpd) in August, exceeding expectations, with a similar increase possible in September.
This aggressive move has intensified oversupply risks. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects global oil production in 2025 will reach 104.9 million bpd, outpacing demand at 103.8 million bpd. OPEC+ is phasing out production cuts, while non-OPEC+ supply is set to grow by 1.4 million bpd. Meanwhile, weak demand growth, especially in China and the U.S., has prompted the IEA to downgrade its 2025 demand forecast to 720,000 bpd. Despite geopolitical tensions, including Middle East conflicts, the structural oversupply remains dominant. Global inventories have risen steadily since February, with a sharp 93-million-barrel increase in May alone. Concurrently, U.S.-China trade tensions, fueled by Trump-era tariffs, have further clouded demand outlooks.
In this context, Trump has urged China to buy “plenty” of U.S. oil. While bilateral oil trade has continued despite tensions, it has been inconsistent. China’s imports of U.S. crude rose 81% in 2023 to 286,000 bpd. However, in 2024, amid escalating tensions and increased imports from Russia and Malaysia, U.S. crude shipments to China fell 53% to 217,000 bpd. From May to July 2024, China made no U.S. oil purchases, the longest pause since 2018, contributing to the lowest U.S. crude exports in over two years.
China, the world’s largest net energy importer, imported over 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent in 2024. It has adopted a defensive strategy, stockpiling reserves at low prices to manage cost and hedge against supply chain risks. This price-sensitive approach has become institutionalized, supporting both energy security and bargaining power.
However, this strategy is rooted in commercial logic rather than broader geopolitical planning. Despite energy security’s centrality to national interests, strategic implementation often lacks alignment.
Russia has emerged as China’s top oil supplier, accounting for 19% of 2023 imports. Yet, as China absorbs cheap oil globally, U.S. shale producers are losing ground due to high costs and limited export access, now a survival concern for the industry.
Meanwhile, major U.S. oil companies are under pressure. In 2024, profits of the top five oil giants fell significantly, with firms like Chevron slashing 15% to 20% of its workforce. This has weakened the traditional energy sector, a key Republican stronghold, thereby undermining Trump’s “energy dominance” strategy.
Facing a difficult midterm election, Trump has shifted focus toward China. On June 25, he signaled a possible easing of Iranian sanctions to allow oil exports to China while simultaneously urging China to resume large-scale U.S. oil purchases. This contradiction reflects a deeper conflict: oil majors’ long-term green transition vs. Trump’s short-term revival of fossil fuels. Stable export markets like China are vital for U.S. shale survival.
Trump’s policy balancing act between low oil prices and oil industry interests highlights China’s opportunity. His political vulnerability offers China a strategic opening to ease trade tensions and gain leverage through “oil diplomacy”.
For China, increased oil trade with the U.S. offers multiple strategic advantages:
Diplomatic Leverage: Responding to Trump’s call aligns with his style and offers a diplomatic gesture, not just economic cooperation.
Cost-Benefit Balance: While U.S. oil may be more expensive, it carries political value. In contrast, Russian oil may seem cheaper but could come with geopolitical costs, especially given Russia’s unpredictable behavior.
Deeper Engagement: Expanding cooperation with U.S. energy firms, many tied to Republican interests, could stabilize bilateral relations and open additional diplomatic channels.
Reserve Strategy: By expanding strategic reserves, China can manage higher purchase prices and potentially resell at favorable rates. U.S. light crude, with its higher quality, justifies a price premium.
State-to-State Negotiation: Positioning the oil trade as a government-level transaction rather than purely commercial can help secure favorable terms. Trump’s direct involvement could lead to better pricing and increased political capital.
Overall, strengthening oil trade with the U.S. serves as a practical adjustment in China’s energy and foreign policy. It helps counterbalance dependence on Russian energy, mitigates strategic vulnerabilities, and positions China more flexibly in global geopolitics. Engaging in “oil diplomacy” with the U.S. at this moment could enhance China’s strategic posture and create new leverage amid shifting global dynamics.