North Korea has unveiled what it says is a new hypersonic missile dubbed Hwasong-11Ma, designed to be fired from a 10-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) that can carry two of the weapons at once. Derived from the earlier Hwasong-11 series of short-range ballistic missiles, the Ma variation has an unpowered boost-glide vehicle on top instead of a traditional warhead and, as a result, is designed to function in a completely different manner.

The Hwasong-11Ma, or a mockup thereof, was among the weapon systems showcased at what has become an annual exhibition of the North Korean military’s latest capabilities this past weekend. Another hypersonic missile design, the Hwasong-8, was a prominent feature at the first of these events in 2021.

The original Hwasong-11, also known as the KN-23 in the West, is a traditional short-range ballistic missile that can reach out to 430 miles (690 kilometers) and has a 1,000-pound (500-kilogram) class unitary high-explosive warhead. First shown publicly back in 2018, it is now a combat-proven weapon, as well. Russia has been employing them against targets in Ukraine since December 2023. Several other Hwasong-11 variations have already emerged in recent years.

Details about the Hwasong-11Ma, also referred to as the Hwasong-11E, are still limited. From the size and shape of the main body, the new missile looks to be based more directly on the previous Hwasong-11Da/Hwasong-11C version. This would make sense as the Da/C, another traditional short-range ballistic missile, is already an enlarged derivative designed to carry larger warheads than the original Hwasong-11. North Korea has previously said it has tested subvariants of the Da/C type with 2.5-ton and 4.5-ton conventional high-explosive warheads, and that it can also be fitted with a nuclear warhead.

In line with its apparent size, Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E looks to use a similar, if not identical, 10-wheeled TEL as the Hwasong-11Da/Hwasong-11C. The original Hwasong-11 is fired from an eight-wheeled TEL.

The Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E’s boost-glide vehicle is similar, in broad strokes, to other wedge-shaped types that North Korea has shown in the past as payloads for much larger missiles. However, the previously seen designs have distinctly different tail fin configurations from the one on the newly unveiled missile, which also has two long strakes extending on either side from the nose.

In general, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles are unpowered and use ballistic missile-like rocket boosters to get them first to an optimal altitude and speed. They then detach from the booster and follow a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, defined as anything above Mach 5, to their targets. Boost-glide vehicles are also designed to be able to maneuver erratically along the way. All of this creates significant challenges for defending forces to detect and track the incoming threat, let alone attempt any kind of intercept.

How close the Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E might be to becoming an operational capability is unknown. North Korea claims to have flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state. It is possible, if not very plausible, that North Korea has and continues to receive assistance in the development of hypersonic weapons from Russia and/or China. The Russian and Chinese armed forces have both fielded hypersonic boost-glide weapons with wedge-shaped vehicles. Russia has used military and other technology transfers of various kinds as part of its ‘payments’ to North Korea in exchange for the latter’s now direct involvement in the war in Ukraine.

The North Korean regime’s pursuit of hypersonic capabilities is certainly real and is a clear response to efforts by the South Koreans and their U.S. allies to expand air and missile defenses. The original Hwasong-11, which is very similar in form and function to the Russian Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2 series, itself is reportedly capable of performing a “pull-up” maneuver in its terminal phase of flight to complicate attempts to intercept it.

In principle, Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11Es could offer North Korea a useful additional layer of hypersonic strike capability for use against better-protected targets inside South Korea. Road-mobile TELs would offer additional flexibility, even if the missiles are relatively short-ranged, as well as a way to create complications for opponents trying to find and fix their locations.

“As the U.S. military buildup in the South Korean region intensifies, our strategic interest in the area has also increased. Therefore, we have allocated our special assets to key targets of interest accordingly,” Kim Jong Un said, speaking generally, during remarks at the opening of the weapons exhibition in Pyongyang, according to state media. “Can the South Korean territory ever be considered a safe place? That is for them to judge.”

The Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E’s development may also reflect lessons learned from Russia’s use of Hwasong-11s in Ukraine. The missile’s initial performance in the war was dismal, but Ukrainian officials have made clear that the Russians and North Koreans subsequently took corrective actions and that it is now a very threatening weapon. Earlier this year, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat also mentioned both the Iskander-M and the KN-23 while openly discussing how the Russians had made further improvements to their ballistic missile capabilities that have put serious pressure on the country’s air defenses.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), via an unclassified Special Inspector General report published in August, confirmed “the UAF [Ukrainian Air Force] struggled to consistently use Patriot air defense systems to protect against Russian ballistic missiles due to recent Russian tactical improvements, including enhancements that enable their missiles to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a traditional ballistic trajectory,” something that TWZ was first to report. The Special Inspector General’s report does not name the ballistic missiles that have proven challenging, but the Iskander-M and the KN-23 are understood to be, by far, the types Russia most commonly employs in strikes on Ukraine.

Last week, the Financial Times newspaper in the United Kingdom reported that Russia’s improvements to its ballistic missile capabilities may have notably helped them evade Ukrainian defenses in attacks on at least four drone production facilities this past summer, citing unnamed U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

As it stands now, U.S.-made Patriots are the only air defense systems in Ukraine’s inventory that offer real anti-ballistic missile capability, and then only in the terminal phase. Ukraine’s Patriots are in high demand, in general.

The Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E also simply underscores the still-growing scale and scope of North Korea’s missile arsenal, overall, when it comes to ballistic and cruise, as well as hypersonic types. As already noted, the Hwasong-11 series has already become particularly prolific, with rail, silo, and submarine-launched variants and derivatives having been demonstrated, in addition to ones fired from wheeled TELs.

It is often the case that North Korea follows up the public debut of new missiles with equally public tests, and more details about at least the Hwasong-11Ma/Hwasong-11E’s claimed capabilities may now begin to emerge.

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