In the last decade, Southeast Asia has experienced an acceleration in the modernization of defense equipment, especially Indonesia, which is now the first operator of modern ballistic missile systems in Southeast Asia thanks to the acquisition of KHAN missiles produced by Roketsan from Turkiye in 2022. The move taken by Indonesia has the potential to change the balance of power and encourage the defense posture of neighboring countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore, which are within firing range of KHAN missiles.
A brief profile about the KHAN missile, the KHAN missile owned by Indonesia is an export variation that has the farthest range of 280 KM. The system package typically includes mobile launchers (MLRS/8×8), command vehicles, and ammunition carrier vehicles, making them suitable for shoot-and-scoot operations as well as high survivability against counter-battery and ISR counter-attacks.
Looking at these specifications, of course, the KHAN missile is suitable for the geography of Indonesia which has a stretching archipelago. Such missiles are capable of striking high-value targets (C2s, ammunition depots, radars, tactical runways) at theater operational distances without relying on interdiction-prone air platforms. In addition, this missile comes from the Türkiye defense industry which is indeed aggressive in exporting and conducting technological cooperation. With these dynamics, it finally provides an opportunity amid global supply uncertainty for Indonesia to modernize its armed forces and this is not the first cooperation between Indonesia and Turkiye.
In the end, KHAN put Indonesia on a precision ground attack capability, even though it was only 280 KM away, but this was enough to reach key facilities in the border area, tactical bases, or aggressor supply lines. So that the surrounding countries will begin to see the need to strengthen layered air/anti-missile defenses.
KHAN, who was stationed in Kalimantan, was close to the Ibu Kota Nusantara and his firing range reached the East Malaysian region. Although not the main target, the existence of ballistic missiles adds pressure for Malaysia to increase its air defense. But Malaysia is also aware that Khan is aimed at external deterrence (such as China and other regional extremist threats) so that intra-ASEAN will not be a target for Indonesia.
For Singapore, which already has advanced air defenses (Aster 30, SPYDER, Green Pine radar). With KHAN presence, it will strengthen the argument that investment in the air defense layer should continue to be expanded. With KHAN in Indonesia’s hands, Singapore can further emphasize air dominance in order to remain able to conduct a first strike in the event of a conflict (although it is unlikely to be an intra-ASEAN scenario).
Therefore, the conclusion for the response of the two countries is:
1. Malaysia will tend to be vigilant but its response is limited and more focused on improving air defense and regional coordination.
2. Singapore will be more proactive, where Singapore will strengthen missile defense and defense diplomacy so that Khan’s presence does not create regional instability.
KHAN presence does not necessarily make ASEAN enter a full-fledged ballistic missile race. But Indonesia opens up the possibility that tactical ballistic missiles will be accepted as a natural part of the defense toolkit in the region. Especially for limited deterrence, and destruction of high-value targets.
And for Türkiye, this is a promising prospect where Türkiye is a new market in the Global South to balance its dependence on NATO. Indonesia as a key partner of ASEAN is a natural target. And KHAN cooperation can be an “entry point” towards a more concrete Strategic Partnership, covering trade, energy, and multilateral diplomacy. Indonesia can also position Turkey as an alternative counterweight to the dominance of traditional suppliers (the US, Russia, and France). So that Turkiye benefits from its image as a global defense exporter, especially since KHAN in Indonesia is the debut of Turkiye ballistic missiles in Southeast Asia.