China officially unveiled a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) called the JL-1 at its sprawling military parade in Beijing yesterday. With the JL-1 displayed alongside submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBM/ICBM), the event also marked the first time that elements of all three legs of the current Chinese strategic nuclear triad had been shown together publicly.
The JL-1 was one of many notable reveals at yesterday’s parade, as TWZ had already been reporting on as preparations had gotten underway earlier in the summer. It is important to note up front that the JL-1 (Jinglei-1) ALBM should not be confused in any way with the now-retired JL-1 (Julang-1) SLBM. Jinglei translates into English variously as sudden thunder, thunderbolt, or thunderclap, while Julang is typically translated as huge wave.
The JL-1 ALBM is very likely to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. Grainy images of an extremely similar, if not identical missile have been seen loaded underneath the fuselages of specialized H-6N missile carrier aircraft on several occasions in the past, but Chinese authorities have not previously acknowledged its existence. The H-6N, which is also capable of being refueled in flight to extend its range, was officially shown to the public for the first time at another major parade in Beijing back in 2019.
The CH-AS-X-13 has also been referred to as the KF-21 in the past, based on past reports that it is derived, at least in part, from the DF-21 series of two-stage ground-launched ballistic missiles. Though this connection has yet to be officially confirmed, the JL-1s, or mockups thereof, shown at the parade yesterday are broadly in line with the design of the DF-21D, which consists of a main stage and a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) on top that detaches in the latter stage of flight. The JL-1 also has a three-fin tail configuration indicative of an air-launched missile. The DF-21D is conventionally armed and optimized for anti-ship strikes. China’s longer-range DF-26 also has a two-stage configuration with a MARV, but is notably larger than the DF-21. Depending on their exact design, MARVs can allow for additional terminal phase course corrections for improved accuracy, as well as maneuvering to make any attempt at an intercept more difficult.
Imagery had also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the CH-AS-X-13, or another different missile for the H-6N, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle (HBGV) on top. Conical HBGV designs that can look similar externally to a MARV also exist.
However they are designed, HBGVs are fundamentally different from MARVs, the latter of which still follow a roughly ballistic path to their impact point. In contrast, after release, HBGVs are designed to proceed along relatively shallow, atmospheric flight paths to their targets while also being able to maneuver erratically along the way. Coupled with hypersonic speed, defined as anything about Mach 5, presents additional challenges for defenders. It is worth noting here that larger ballistic missiles also reach hypersonic speeds in the terminal phase of flight.
The Pentagon has also posited in the past that the CH-AS-X-13 may be capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, as is the case with the DF-21 series and the DF-26. The connection to the DF-21, and the DF-21D most specifically, has also prompted previous discussions about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups. Few hard details were offered during the parade about the JL-1, but it was explicitly described as a nuclear weapon, though this would not preclude the existence of a conventionally-armed version for use against targets at sea or on land.
During the event, state media narrators also reportedly said the JL-1 has a range of approximately 4,970 miles (8,000 kilometers). If true, this is substantially longer than the assessed maximum range of current-generation DF-21 variants, as well as the DF-26. The Pentagon’s most recent unclassified annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments, released in 2024, said the DF-21D “has a range exceeding 1,500 km [932 miles].” That same report pegged the DF-26’s range at approximately 2,485 miles (4,000 kilometers).
As a general rule, missiles fired from aircraft benefit from the speed and altitude of the launch platform, particularly when it comes to range. As such, an air-launched ballistic missile can reasonably be expected to have greater reach than a comparable design launched from the ground or a vessel at sea. As an example, Russia’s air-launched Kinzhal is understood to have an appreciably longer range than the ground-launched Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile it is based on.
Whatever its exact capabilities might be, the JL-1’s appearance at the parade yesterday had the additional and perhaps greater significance of being the first official display of the aerial component of China’s present nuclear triad to the public. Of the currently accepted nine nuclear powers globally (which includes Israel and its unacknowledged stockpile), only the United States, Russia, China, and India field triads in any form. The core arguments for having a nuclear triad are the operational flexibility it offers, as well as its resilience to attack. Even if one or two legs were to be neutralized, capacity would remain to launch retaliatory strikes.
The Pentagon had publicly assessed back in 2019 that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was moving to resume a strategic nuclear deterrence role with the appearance of the H-6N. Before then, the exact status of China’s stockpile of air-dropped nuclear bombs had become unclear. With the operational fielding of the H-6N in 2020, the Pentagon further assessed that the PLA had established a “nascent nuclear triad.”
“The PLAAF has operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform for the air component of the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China] nuclear triad. The H-6N, compared to other H-6 bombers, adds an air-to-air refueling probe as well as its recessed fuselage modifications that enable external carriage of a nuclear-capable ALBM,” the Pentagon wrote in its unclassified 2024 report to Congress on Chinese military developments. “The ALBM carried by the H-6N appears to be armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle, indicating the ALBM – along with the DF-26 IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] – likely can conduct nuclear precision strikes against targets in the Indo-Pacific theater.”
China’s triad, which we now know officially includes the JL-1, is part of a larger nuclear build-up underway in the country that also includes expanding the land and sea-based legs. The construction of vast new fields of silos for ICBMs in recent years has been a particularly visible component of this broader effort. Those silos may not all be intended to hold missiles as part of a ‘shell game’ to create targeting complications for opponents.
“Over the next decade, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it multiple options on the escalation ladder,” according to the Pentagon’s 2024 report on China to Congress. “In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.”
“The PRC has not publicly or formally acknowledged or explained its nuclear expansion and modernization. The buildup almost certainly is due to the PRC’s broader and longer-term perceptions of progressively increased U.S.-PRC strategic competition. The PLA’s nuclear expansion and modernization very likely are tied to its overall military strategy – seeking to close capability gaps and become a competitive global power,” the report added. “As a result, the PRC probably perceives that a stronger nuclear force is needed to deter U.S. intervention, check potential nuclear escalation or first strike, and will allow for increased control of the scope and scale of escalation during a conflict in a way its previously smaller and less diverse nuclear force could not.”
All of this is in line with the establishment of a nuclear triad, as well as the Pentagon’s past assessment that China has been moving to adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) deterrent posture. LOW entails a plan to execute a massive counterstrike upon detecting incoming nuclear threats, primarily to help ensure a retaliatory strike can be successfully initiated before the hostile weapons reach their targets.
There have also been separate discussions about how the growing size of China’s nuclear stockpile points to plans for so-called countervalue targeting, in which weapons would also be aimed at an enemy’s population centers. Strikes directed at military targets are referred to as counterforce.
Altogether, the public debut of China’s JL-1 ALBM is a very important development with ramifications well beyond the missile itself.
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