Israel

As the Israel-Iran ceasefire staggered into effect on Tuesday, all of the combatants launched a plausible argument for victory.

In the United States, President Donald Trump claimed that both his diplomatic and military interventions had largely been responsible for halting the fighting, while the leaders of Iran and Israel each claimed to have secured a decisive win in a regional contest that dates back decades.

In Israel, however, the emerging narrative is that the end result of the conflict with Iran has solidified the position of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Just two weeks ago, Netanyahu was in real trouble. On the night before he ordered the unilateral strike on regional nemesis Iran, his governing coalition was only able to survive thanks to a last-minute deal with dissenting members. Public and political opinion had also appeared to have turned against his war on Gaza, and internationally, Israel’s allies were beginning to protest the blockade of the Palestinian enclave.

Now, he can argue that he has severely weakened Israel’s most dangerous regional enemy, Iran, and he claims that its nuclear programme has been destroyed and sent “down the drain”.

The Iran threat

Buoyed by rising poll numbers and the sense of having successfully confronted Iran, Netanyahu may, according to reports in Israel, seek to take advantage politically and call snap elections.

Having built up the threat of Iran over three decades, and repeatedly warned that his country’s principal bogeyman was about to build a nuclear weapon despite Tehran’s denials, Netanyahu can now take advantage of being seen as the man who ended that threat.

“Entire generations have grown up in Israel with this fear of Iran,” Israeli political scientist Ori Goldberg said. “There’s a foundational narrative that there’s this crazy state out there that, without any logic or reason, wants to destroy us.”

“My oldest daughter is 22 now, and has never known anything else,” Goldberg said. “Netanyahu is now getting the credit for having confronted that.”

In a video statement released earlier today, Israel’s far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich framed the conflict in characteristically apocalyptic terms, telling his social media followers, “The State of Israel has defeated in the last twelve days the empire of evil that threatened the entire world and sought the destruction of Israel.”

That argument is supported by much of the Israeli public – which has largely supported right-wing and far-right parties in recent years.

“Netanyahu is stronger than ever,” Mitchell Barak, an Israeli pollster and former political aide to several senior Israeli political figures, including Netanyahu, told Al Jazeera. “No one’s going to bring him down, no one’s going to challenge him, not his opponents, not his detractors, nobody.”

“He showed that Israel can go it alone. He held off, before American help, then continued alone. Bennett, Lapid can’t challenge that,” Barak continued, referring to two former Israeli prime ministers, the right-wing Naftali Bennett and the centrist Yair Lapid, who are both opponents of Netanyahu.

Not so rosy

However, how long the Israeli prime minister’s perceived victory will last is uncertain. The Iranian government and its Islamic Republic form of governance remain in place, even as Netanyahu has repeatedly called for its overthrow. Netanyahu insinuated that regime change was a possible result of the conflict between Israel and Iran, and Trump used the term in a social media post on Sunday, before clarifying on Monday that he was opposed to regime change because it could lead to “chaos”.

And despite Israeli claims, it is too early to have a definitive answer on the condition of Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes. The former, despite Israel’s effective air defence systems, led to the deaths of at least 28 Israelis during the conflict, while Iran is likely to shroud its nuclear programme in secrecy going forward. Early intelligence assessments are reported to have determined that Iran’s nuclear timeline has been delayed, but not destroyed.

And analysts have previously suggested to Al Jazeera that Iran is likely to accelerate its nuclear programme, with hardliners within the Iranian regime now even more convinced of the need for a plausible deterrent against Israel.

“There are a lot of unanswered questions out there, such as how much uranium remains enriched, or even where it is, but, in the short term, it doesn’t really matter whether it’s been destroyed or not,” Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera. “Netanyahu and his allies in the White House will be able to spin it. What matters to them is that Iran has suffered a real physical and psychological blow.”

However, how long Netanyahu may be able to survive on spin alone remains far from certain, Mekelberg added. “Every Houdini eventually comes across a lock they can’t pick,” he said.

Netanyahu’s actions since the start of Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023 have arguably made his country’s position weaker in the long term. Israel’s international isolation has increased, with revulsion worldwide at the Israeli military’s actions in Gaza, where it has killed more than 56,000 Palestinians. Netanyahu himself is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, and South Africa has led a number of other countries in taking Israel to the International Court of Justice, accusing it of carrying out genocide in Gaza.

The images of those killed, including thousands of children, and the total destruction of Gaza, have spread on social media in particular, turning many in the West against Israel. This has become particularly noticeable in the US, where even on the right – traditionally a bastion of support for Israel – support for the country has become controversial.

And while Trump has shown himself to be a pro-Israeli president, the perception among many in his “America First” movement that Israel dragged the US into a war against Iran has led to anger and heavy criticism of Israel among many of Trump’s most prominent supporters.

Trump himself publicly reprimanded Israel after the latter planned to launch a large attack on Iran after the ceasefire began on Tuesday. Eventually, Israel conducted only a small and symbolic attack, following what it said was a ceasefire violation by Iran – one that Trump was clear did not warrant a response.

Some indication of the fury that has greeted Netanyahu’s decision to abuse the terms of Trump’s ceasefire was provided by Trump’s former chief strategist and ally Steve Bannon. Speaking on his War Room podcast on Tuesday, Bannon called Netanyahu a “bald-faced liar” and Israel a “protectorate”.

Appearing to address Netanyahu directly, Bannon continued, “You have the gall – particularly after what [Trump] did for you and the grief he’s taken over here – you have the gall … When he said, ‘This is what I’ve done, and I need you to be a partner, I need you to stand down first’, you lied to him. That’s why he’s furious”.

Gaza deal?

While Israel can put the conflict with Iran behind it – for now – the war on Gaza continues, with no sign of Israel finding an alternative force to Hamas to rule the enclave, and no deal to secure the release of the Israeli captives still held in the Palestinian territory.

That may put a wrench in any plans for Netanyahu to secure another term as prime minister in the short term.

“I’m not so sure about snap elections,” Aida Touma-Suleiman, a member of parliament representing the Hadash-Ta’al Party, said.

“The polls are in Netanyahu’s favour, but it’s still not certain. I can’t see Netanyahu going to the polls with Gaza still going on,” she added, suggesting that the prime minister might wait for the summer parliamentary recess on July 26, when he would be freer to negotiate some kind of conclusion to the war on the enclave.

Based on Netanyahu’s attitude towards negotiations over the past 20 months, it is not clear that finding a deal to end the war on Gaza is something he wants. Instead, any deal is likely to require a significant push from Trump – if the US president wants to make one.

“I can’t see how Netanyahu can reach any kind of settlement in Gaza,” Goldberg said. “Everyone’s waiting for Trump to act again … Negotiations with Hamas may start again, but it’ll be Trump that imposes some kind of end to [the war].”

Israel launched an unprecedented strike on Iran’s military and nuclear sites on June 13, a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board passed a resolution saying Tehran was not complying with its commitment to nuclear safeguards.

Though Israel did not use the United Nations nuclear watchdog’s resolution to justify the Iran attack, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the IAEA resolution, calling it “a necessary and overdue step” that confirmed Iran’s “systematic clandestine nuclear weapons programme”.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Organization in a joint statement condemned the resolution, calling it “politically motivated”. The resolution, the joint statement said, “seriously undermines the credibility and integrity of the IAEA”.

Tehran insists its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes and that its facilities are monitored by the UN nuclear watchdog.

Here’s what the IAEA said about the Iranian nuclear programe earlier this month, and its criticisms against its past actions.

Did the IAEA think that Iran was building nuclear weapons?

The IAEA cannot fully assess Iran’s nuclear energy programmes, as Tehran halted its implementation of the Additional Protocol in February 2021, which permitted the IAEA enhanced inspection rights – including snap inspections and continuous surveillance.

Iran continued to comply with IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement after 2021, which permitted access to Iran’s declared nuclear sites (Natanz, Fordow, Bushehr) and also allowed for routine monitoring and verification of declared nuclear material.

At a press event in Vienna on June 9, however, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi said Iran’s recent failure to comply with reporting obligations had “led to a significant reduction in the agency’s ability to verify whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful”.

During the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting (which took place from June 9-13), Grossi said Iran had “repeatedly either not answered… the agency’s questions” regarding the presence of man-made uranium particles at three locations – Varamin, Marivan and Turquzabad.

Grossi also described Iran’s “rapid accumulation of highly-enriched uranium” as a “serious concern”, referring to the 60 percent pure uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz.

In 2023, the IAEA had discovered 83.7 percent pure uranium particles at Fordow – close to the 90 percent purity required to make an atomic bomb.

On June 12, one day before Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the IAEA board passed a resolution declaring that Tehran was breaching its non-proliferation obligations.

Al Jazeera’s Hashem Ahelbarra, reporting from Vienna on June 12, noted it was the first time in almost 20 years that the IAEA, which monitors Iran’s nuclear programme, had accused Tehran of breaching its non-proliferation obligations.

Last week, however, Grossi emphasised that the IAEA had found no evidence of Iranian nuclear weapons production.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on June 19, Grossi was emphatic that Iran’s alleged violations of its assurances had not led his agency to conclude that Tehran was building bombs.

“We have not seen elements to allow us, as inspectors, to affirm that there was a nuclear weapon that was being manufactured or produced somewhere in Iran,” he said.

United States Vice President JD Vance invoked the IAEA resolution to make a case for the military action against Iran.

“They’ve been found in violation of their non-proliferation obligations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is hardly a rightwing organization,” he posted on X on June 17.

The US president ordered his military to bomb three Iranian sites on June 22 – a decision welcomed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been making claims for decades that Iran was on the cusp of making nuclear weapons.

Trump has claimed that the nuclear sites have been “obliterated” and Iran’s nuclear programme has been set back by decades.

How has Iran responded?

On June 23, the national security committee of Iran’s parliament approved the outline of a bill designed to suspend Tehran’s cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog, committee spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei told the Tasnim news agency.

Rezaei said that, according to the bill, installing surveillance cameras, allowing inspections, and submitting reports to the IAEA would be suspended as long as the security of nuclear facilities is not guaranteed. Iran joined the IAEA in 1959.

In particular, Rezaei said Iran asserts its right, as a 1968 signatory to the UN’s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including uranium enrichment.

Parliament still has to approve the NPT withdrawal bill in a plenary.

Tehran has long complained that the treaty fails to protect it from attack by a country with a nuclear arsenal, the US, and another widely believed to have one, Israel.

What’s more, Iranian authorities have claimed Grossi is looking to become the next secretary-general of the UN, and is therefore sacrificing the nuclear watchdog’s integrity by adopting pro-Western rhetoric to gain personal favour.

On June 1, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Eslami, told state TV: “Rafael Grossi [is] driven by his ambitions and a strong desire to become the UN secretary-general, is seeking to gain the approval of a few specific countries and align himself with their goals.”

Did the IAEA skirt controversy over the Fukushima disaster?

In June 2023, the Japanese government started releasing treated, but still radioactive, water from the ruined Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station into the Pacific Ocean.

The IAEA gave the controversial plan the green light following a two-year review.

At the time, Grossi said the agency’s safety review had concluded the plan was “consistent with relevant international safety standards… [and] the controlled, gradual discharges of the treated water to the sea would have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment”.

More than 1.3 million tonnes of water had built up at the Fukushima plant since a March 2011 tsunami destroyed the power station’s electricity and cooling systems and triggered the world’s worst nuclear disaster since Chornobyl.

The release of the water, which began in August 2023, encountered fierce resistance from Japan’s neighbours and Pacific island nations as well as fishing and agricultural communities in and around Fukushima, which fear for their livelihoods.

Beijing, in particular, was a fierce critic of the water discharge plan. In a statement following the IAEA’s July 2023 report, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs chastised its “hasty release”, claiming it “failed to fully reflect views from experts”.

Are there echoes of Iraq in the current debate about Iran?

To several observers, there are.

In the lead-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the US and the United Kingdom asserted that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including chemical weapons, in addition to pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.

These claims were central in justifying military action under the argument that Iraq posed an imminent threat to regional and global security.

Towards the end of 2002, the IAEA carried out several inspections of Iraqi weapons programmes.

In early 2003, they established the existence of high-tolerance aluminium tubes in Iraq. In theory, these can be used to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear warhead.

The aluminium tubes became a cornerstone in the Bush administration’s Iraq mandate. As the only physical evidence the US could brandish, they gave credibility to the apocalyptic imagery invoked by President George W Bush and his advisers.

The tubes were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programmes”, Condoleezza Rice, the US national security adviser, explained on CNN on September 8, 2002. “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”

For its part, the IAEA refuted the theory that the tubes were destined for use in a nuclear programme. And after the invasion, extensive searches found no active WMD programmes in Iraq.

The US bombed Iran’s nuclear sites Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.

United States President Donald Trump has insisted that the strikes on several of Iran’s nuclear sites last week “completely destroyed” the facilities, rejecting US media reports citing a Pentagon assessment that the attacks only set Tehran’s nuclear programme back by a few months.

An initial intelligence evaluation suggested that the US bombardment failed to destroy Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN reported on Tuesday, citing officials familiar with the military intelligence report from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Two people familiar with the assessment had told CNN that Iran’s “enriched uranium was not destroyed” and the centrifuges were “largely intact”.

Another source told the US broadcaster that, according to the assessment, enriched uranium had been moved before the US strikes on Sunday.

Trump has maintained that the US strikes destroyed nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

“Fake news CNN, together with the failing New York Times, have teamed up in an attempt to demean one of the most successful military strikes in history,” Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social platform.

“The nuclear sites in Iran are completely destroyed!” he wrote.

When reporters asked him about Iran rebuilding its nuclear programme on Tuesday, Trump said: “That place is under rock. That place is demolished.”

The White House said the intelligence assessment was “flat-out wrong”.

Press secretary Karoline Leavitt told CNN in a statement: “Everyone knows what happens when you drop fourteen 30,000 pound bombs perfectly on their targets: total obliteration.”

Steve Witkoff, the US special envoy to the Middle East, also dismissed the intelligence report.

“All three of those had most, if not all, the centrifuges damaged or destroyed in a way that it will be almost impossible for them to resurrect that programme,” Witkoff told Fox News on Monday night.

“In my view, and in many other experts’ views who have seen the raw data, it will take a period of years.”

Witkoff also called the leaking of the report “treasonous”.

“It ought to be investigated. And whoever did it, whoever is responsible for it, should be held accountable,” he added.

Reporting from Washington, DC, Al Jazeera’s Shihab Rattansi said an information war is under way.

“There are clearly figures in Washington who are very keen to leak a very preliminary Defense Intelligence Agency bombing assessment,” he said.

He noted that White House reporters received a press statement, saying the “leaking of this alleged assessment is a clear attempt to demean President Trump and discredit the brave fighter pilots who conducted a perfectly executed mission to obliterate Iran’s nuclear programme”.

“This is the first moment we are seeing, post-bombing, of the information landscape and how this information will be used and what effect it might have on Donald Trump going forward,” Rattansi said.

Despite Israel’s considerable military power in the Middle East, it can never achieve regional hegemony—a position that requires unquestionable dominance over all competitors and acceptance of its authority by neighboring countries. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel, relying on its military superiority and broad Western support, particularly from the United States, has managed to establish significant influence in the region. However, Israel’s ambitions to become the dominant power in the Middle East face structural, political, and social obstacles that go beyond its military capabilities. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran in June 2025, under the operation “Lion Rising,” are an example of the country’s aggressive efforts to weaken its rivals and demonstrate its authority. However, these actions have only led to greater regional instability and strengthened resistance against Israel. As Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard, argues, true hegemony requires political acceptance and regional legitimacy—something Israel, due to its policies, is unable to achieve.

Limitations of Military Power

With a military budget of $27.5 billion in 2023 and access to advanced technologies, Israel possesses one of the region’s most powerful militaries. Its attacks on Lebanon, Syria, and recently Iran, which targeted both military and civilian infrastructure, demonstrate its ability to strike heavy blows against its competitors. However, military power alone is not sufficient for hegemony. A regional hegemon must be able to fully suppress its rivals or compel them to accept its authority—a challenge Israel has failed at. For example, despite weakening Hezbollah and other resistance groups after attacks in 2023 and 2024, these groups continue to act as a resilient force against Israel. The June 2025 attacks on Iran, while causing significant damage, have not been able to fully halt Iran’s nuclear program. Reports suggest that the Fordow facility remains operational, and Iran is able to accelerate its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. These failures highlight that Israel’s military power, while destructive, cannot lead to lasting dominance, as regional resistance against it persists.

Lack of Regional Legitimacy

Hegemony requires acceptance and legitimacy among regional countries, something Israel lacks due to its aggressive and occupation-driven policies. The occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the siege and bombing of Gaza, and the repression of Palestinians, condemned by human rights organizations as gross violations of human rights, have painted Israel as a repressive force. These policies have not only angered Palestinians but have also prevented regional countries, including powerful players like Turkey and Qatar, from accepting Israel as the dominant power. Even countries that have established diplomatic relations with Israel, such as the UAE and Bahrain, maintain these relations largely for strategic reasons and under Western pressure, not out of acceptance of Israel’s hegemony. Furthermore, recent attacks on Iran, conducted amidst nuclear negotiations, have exacerbated regional anger and strengthened Iran’s position as a force of resistance against Israeli aggression. This lack of legitimacy is a significant barrier to Israel’s hegemonic ambitions.

Geopolitical Complexity of the Middle East

The Middle East is a region of multiple actors and conflicting interests, making it practically impossible for any country, including Israel, to achieve hegemony. Iran, despite economic and military pressures, still maintains significant influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, although its proxy networks have been weakened. Turkey, with its own regional ambitions, and Saudi Arabia, with its vast financial resources, are also powerful competitors unwilling to accept Israeli dominance. Even the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which was seen as a blow to Iran, failed to shift the balance of power in Israel’s favor, as new actors like Sunni groups backed by Turkey entered the fray. Hegemony requires military superiority over a mix of rivals, but Israel has not been able to establish full dominance even over a single actor like Iran, which, despite recent attacks, still has the ability to respond. These geopolitical complexities, combined with persistent regional resistance, prevent Israel from achieving hegemonic status.

Dependence on the West and Strategic Fragility

Despite its military power, Israel is heavily dependent on the support of the United States and Europe. Annual U.S. military aid of $3.8 billion and political backing in institutions like the United Nations form the backbone of Israel’s power. However, this dependence creates a strategic vulnerability. If Western support decreases—either due to changes in U.S. domestic policies or global pressure for Israel to be held accountable for human rights violations—Israel will lose its ability to maintain its current position. True hegemony requires strategic self-sufficiency, which Israel lacks. Moreover, aggressive actions like the “Lion Rising” operation increase the risk of drawing the U.S. into a broader conflict, which could reduce Western support. This fragility shows that Israel, rather than a hegemon, functions more as a player dependent on foreign powers.

Global Consequences of Israel’s Actions

Israel’s efforts to weaken its rivals, such as the recent attacks on Iran, have not led to hegemony but have instead exacerbated regional and global instability. These attacks, carried out amid nuclear negotiations between Iran and global powers, disrupted diplomatic efforts and increased the risk of a broader conflict. These actions could disrupt the global energy supply chain, as Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz plays a critical role in oil and gas markets. Additionally, the anger generated by Israel’s aggressive policies has sparked widespread protests in the Muslim world, raising the risk of political and security instability on a global scale. These consequences, rooted in Israel’s actions, show that the pursuit of hegemony not only remains unattainable but leads to further instability.

The Need for Peace, Not Domination

Israel cannot become the hegemon of the Middle East because true hegemony requires a combination of military power, political legitimacy, and regional acceptance—elements Israel lacks. Israel’s long-term security lies not in military domination but in achieving a lasting political agreement with its neighbors, including the Palestinians. Israel’s aggressive policies, from occupying Palestinian territories to attacking Iran, have only strengthened regional resistance and pushed the country further from its hegemonic goal. The world must recognize this reality and, instead of blindly supporting Israel’s actions, focus on diplomacy and dialogue to establish lasting peace in the Middle East. Only through this approach can the endless cycle of tension and conflict be broken.

Published on
25/06/2025 – 8:08 GMT+2

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Investors kept an eye on the Middle East on Wednesday as a fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel appeared to hold after initial shakiness.

Both sides claimed victory; Iran’s president said Israel had suffered a “historic punishment”, while Israel’s prime minister argued the offensive had removed “the Iranian nuclear threat”.

A new US intelligence report nonetheless found that Tehran’s nuclear programme had only been set back by a few months by US strikes. Washington denied the findings of the leaked report.

Early in Europe, Brent crude had risen around 1.15% to $67.91 a barrel, while WTI was 1.21% higher at $65.15. The prices suggest the market has still not fully calmed after the conflict in the Middle East, with investors continuing to monitor the shaky ceasefire.

US President Trump rebuked both countries for violating the announced ceasefire on Tuesday. 

“Israel, as soon as we made the deal, they came out and they dropped a load of bombs, the likes of which I’ve never seen before, the biggest load that we’ve seen,” he said.

On his social media platform, Truth Social, he wrote: “Israel, do not drop those bombs. If you do, it is a major violation. Bring your pilots home, now!”

Trump claimed that neither Iran nor Israel “know what the f*** they’re doing”.

Stocks, meanwhile, rose modestly on Wednesday. Dow Jones futures rose 0.06% to 43,452.00, while S&P 500 futures gained 0.05% to 6,149.25.

In Asian trading, the Shanghai Composite index climbed 0.44% to 3,435.60, the Nikkei 225 rose 0.31% to 38,910.93, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng jumped 0.78% to 24,364.79, while South Korea’s Kospi was almost flat, rising 0.01% to 3,104.20.

Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 notched up 0.09% to 8,563.20.

The US Dollar Index was up 0.13% at 97.98 although the currency has still failed to recover from losses seen earlier this year. The euro rose less than 1% against the dollar while the Japanese Yen dropped around 0.12% against its US safe-haven alternative.

“The situation in the Middle East is fluid. While the downside risks have subsided, the situation can change quickly and the balance of risks remains weighted toward higher oil prices,” said Ryan Sweet, Chief US Economist at Oxford Economics, on Tuesday.

Since Sunday, the Middle East has lurched from escalating war to fragile ceasefire. A truce seems to be holding, and what US President Donald Trump called “The 12 Day War” between Israel and Iran seems to be over – for now.

Meanwhile, Trump, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Iran’s leaders have all claimed that the pause in the conflict happened on their terms.

So, what’s the truth? What did Israel achieve? Did Iran manage to defend its strategic assets? And is the truce a pathway to peace?

How did events unfold?

Late on Saturday night, at Israel’s behest, the US entered the Israeli-Iranian war with strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, “completely obliterating” them, in Trump’s words.

On Monday, Iran struck back, firing missiles at the largest US airbase in the Middle East, Al Udeid in Qatar.

It appeared as though the Middle East was poised for a broader, longer war.

But within hours, Trump announced on Truth Social, his social media platform, “It has been fully agreed by and between Israel and Iran that there will be a Complete and Total CEASEFIRE.”

Trump called it “the 12 Day War … that could have gone on for years and destroyed the Middle East”.

Four hours after the ceasefire was supposed to take effect, Israel launched a strike against Iran in retaliation for what it said were two ballistic missiles entering its airspace, launched from Iran. Both were intercepted. Israel’s retaliation destroyed a radar station near Tehran.

Trump was furious. “I’m really unhappy that Israel went out this morning,” he told reporters.

“We’ve got two countries that have been fighting so hard and for so long, that they don’t know what the f*** they’re doing.”

Iran said it did not fire those missiles. By 11:30 GMT the ceasefire was back in effect. Trump spoke to Netanyahu.

“ISRAEL is not going to attack Iran. All planes will turn around and head home, while doing a friendly ‘Plane Wave’ to Iran. Nobody will be hurt, the Ceasefire is in effect!” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

What did Israel achieve?

Israel has long claimed that Iran is its number one existential threat, but it has never before struck Tehran’s nuclear facilities.

On June 13, it crossed that red line, bombing the surface installations of the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and the Isfahan nuclear technological complex. Iran retaliated by launching drones and missiles at Israel.

Israel had struck nuclear installations in Syria and Iraq before, but it has now proved it can carry out a complex mission much further afield.

It also withstood international accusations that its mission wasn’t legal. Israel claims it was anticipatory self-defence, but not everyone agrees that Iran is developing a nuclear bomb, or that it planned to use it against Israel imminently.

“I speak with world leaders and they are very impressed by our determination and the achievements of our forces,” Netanyahu said on June 18.

Finally, Israel proved it can convince the US to enter a limited Middle Eastern offensive it has started. In previous wars in 1967 and 1973, the US had provided material support to Israel when it was attacked, but had not assisted it with direct operational involvement.

Netanyahu thanked Trump for “standing alongside us”.

Operation Rising Lion against Iran took place in the wake of conflicts that Israel has waged against Iran’s regional allies – the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah have been weakened over the past two years.

Did Iran manage to defend its nuclear programme?

Israel managed to significantly damage surface targets in Iran, and the US claims to have destroyed underground nuclear facilities.

But while satellite photography shows that their missiles hit their mark, there is no independent confirmation available to verify what was destroyed. That will need on-site inspections.

“At this time, no one – including the IAEA – is in a position to have fully assessed the underground damage at Fordow,” said Rafael Grossi, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear watchdog, on Monday, after the US strikes. “Given the explosive payload utilized, and the extreme vibration-sensitive nature of centrifuges, very significant damage is expected to have occurred,” he said.

Also unknown are the whereabouts of 400 kilogrammes (880 pounds) of highly enriched uranium that the IAEA has said Iran now possesses.

Mohammad Eslami, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, suggested the nuclear programme would emerge unscathed. “Preparations for recovery had already been anticipated, and our plan is to prevent any interruption in production or services,” he said on Tuesday in a statement carried by the semi-official Mehr news agency.

Meanwhile, confusion lingers over the source of two ballistic missiles that hit Israel on Tuesday morning, three and a half hours after the ceasefire began. Iran’s government officially denied having launched the missiles.

So who did? And were they fired accidentally – like the Iranian missile that accidentally brought down a Ukrainian passenger plane in 2021, killing 176 people?

How likely is another strike on Iran?

What Israel and Iran have agreed to is a ceasefire. They haven’t made peace.

On Iran’s nuclear programme, experts say that there are – broadly speaking – two possible future paths.

Renewed UN inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities and a new treaty with Iran, perhaps resembling former US President Barack Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015, might help Tehran ease global pressure on its programme, though it was Trump who pulled out of the JCPOA, not Iran.

This is where European powers can play a role. Three of them, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on June 20, along with the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, in an effort to avert US strikes. That bid failed, but although the EU cannot alone leverage Iran into a compromise, it can act as a counterpoint to US-Israeli hard power.

“Iran will try to involve the Europeans diplomatically by proposing enhanced monitoring and making commitments in its nuclear programme,” Ioannis Kotoulas, an adjunct lecturer in geopolitics at Athens University, told Al Jazeera.

“The US could accept a peaceful nuclear programme – [US Secretary of State Marco] Rubio has already said so. The likelihood is that the US won’t try to force regime change,” he said. “Europe is now Iran’s only way out. Russia is unreliable.”

But Israel has previously tried to scupper any nuclear deal between the West and Iran, and is unlikely yo accept a fresh agreement.

And will Iran even be open to a compromise, after the US pulled out of its previous nuclear deal with Tehran, then changed goalposts during recent talks, and finally joined Israel in bombing Iranian nuclear facilities while they were supposed to be negotiating an agreement?

“That really depends on dynamics within the country and how any climbdown is phrased, but there have already been calls to cease uranium enrichment from activists within the country,” Ali Ansari, a professor of Iranian history at St Andrews University, told Al Jazeera.

So far, Iran sounds unyielding in the pursuit of its nuclear programme.

On Monday, the national security committee of Iran’s parliament approved a bill pushing for the full suspension of Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEA if approved in a plenary session.

Meanwhile, Trump emphasised on Tuesday on social media that he would not allow Iran’s nuclear programme to resume.

If that fundamental tension remains intact, another round of strikes and counterstrikes that suck in the US might only be a matter of time.

Following the U.S. attack on Iran’s primary nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan, Tehran faces nothing but bad options. Militarily, Iran can escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces and allies in the region, as it did on Monday with missile attacks on U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq. Iran could also close the Strait of Hormuz, withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty or even attempt a rapid “breakout” run to a bomb with its residual capabilities. Each of these options virtually assures an American military response that goes far beyond Iran’s nuclear program, possibly leading to a targeted campaign to topple the regime, the Islamic Republic’s greatest nightmare.

A more likely military response would therefore be for Iran to respond by continuing to attack Israel — as it did just hours after the U.S. strike — in an attempt to turn the conflict into a war of attrition that Israel can ill afford. Israel could escalate to try to end the war more swiftly and avoid prolonging losses.

Diplomatically, Iran can return to negotiations but rebuff President Trump’s demand for an “unconditional surrender,” whose terms he had not spelled out. In reality, these would likely include the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and significant curbs to its regional role, along with long-term inspections and more. Should Tehran rebuff these demands, it would greatly increase the risk of further American military action, including against the regime itself — targeting military and civilian leaders and infrastructure, not just nuclear sites.

Alternatively, it can essentially accede to Trump’s demands, in which case it avoids direct American intervention and the war ends, but Iran loses its ultimate security guarantor — the nuclear capability — and virtually all of its leverage to seek any concessions in further international talks. The regime would also appear so weak that the probability of a domestic uprising would increase exponentially.

Whichever option Iran chooses, the very future of the Islamic Republic has never been in greater peril. Accordingly, the prospects for a dramatic positive transformation of the Middle Eastern strategic landscape have never been greater.

The decades-long American effort to establish a regional coalition of Arab states and Israel, to contain Iran, will be given a significant boost, as the former gains confidence to do so in the face of a greatly weakened Iran and resurgent U.S. in the region. The dangers of proliferation, at least in the Middle East, might be greatly reduced. Israel will have demonstrated — albeit this time only with critical American assistance — that the “Begin doctrine” (Israeli determination to take all means necessary to prevent a hostile regional state from developing nuclear weapons) still applies. Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the three most likely proliferators in the region after Iran, will have little reason to pursue nuclear weapons.

Russia’s and China’s inability to provide their Iranian ally with any practical backing during the war stands in stark contrast to the U.S. and Israel and is particularly galling for Iran because of its strong support for the Kremlin during Russia’s war in Ukraine. Moscow and Beijing will suffer a significant reduction in their regional standing, accruing to Washington’s benefit. The Middle East will once again be considered a clearly American-dominated region, in which Russia and China will have to tread more carefully.

There are some in the U.S. who fear Mideast conflicts distract American attention from the competition with China — the only nation approaching the economic influence of the U.S. today — and Russia. But taking a direct role in this Iran-Israel conflict has not diverted American focus from Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, it has significantly strengthened Washington’s global stature compared with both countries. China will be more hesitant to attack Taiwan now that the U.S. has demonstrated willingness to bomb aggressors against American allies.

An Israel whose enemies have been dramatically weakened, and which no longer faces an existential threat from Iran, would be in a far better position to make progress on the Palestinian issue, beginning with an end to the war in Gaza. Indeed, it would not be far-fetched to assume that Trump, always transactional, may have made this a precondition for his support for Israel in the war. Saudi-Israeli normalization will be back on the table.

Netanyahu has prepared for this moment for 30 years, for the opportunity to put an end to the only existential threat Israel continues to face. From the reviled leader whose administration allowed the Oct. 7 fiasco and various outrages in domestic affairs, he now stands to be remembered as one of Israel’s great heroes. Moreover, a favorable outcome to the war may very well save him from what otherwise appears to have been a looming electoral defeat — which could have been followed by jail time, given the corruption charges he faces.

The bigger question is whether Netanyahu — whose deep understanding of Israel’s overall strategic circumstances no one has ever doubted — will wish to use this opportunity to crown his legacy not just with saving Israel from an existential military threat, but also from an almost equally severe demographic challenge to its own future as a Jewish and democratic state. Fordo may be gone; the Palestinians remain. He would truly cement his standing in history if he ended the Gaza war and paved the way to a resolution of the Palestinian issue.

Both Netanyahu and Trump deserve credit for taking daring action, and they must be prepared to continue doing so. This is not the time to be fainthearted but to continue pressing the advantage. They have engaged in a classic case of coercive diplomacy, the use of military force for diplomatic ends, and must see it through to the desired end: a diplomatic agreement with Iran that ensures, with an inspections regime of unprecedented intrusiveness, that it can never again develop nuclear capabilities for military purposes, puts severe limits on its missile capabilities and curtails its malign regional role.

Even with a tentative cease-fire now in place, achieving an agreement of this sort will not be easy. The Iranians are unlikely to fully accede to American demands unless they truly feel that they have their backs to the wall, and even then, they are unusually effective negotiators. Persistence, focus and attention for detail, not known to be Trump’s forte, will now be called for. A historic opening has been made; it must not be squandered.

Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security advisor, is a senior fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. Colin P. Clarke is the director of research at the Soufan Group, a security and intelligence consulting firm based in New York City.

As tensions escalate between Iran and its Western adversaries, the Iranian government is now considering one of the most consequential diplomatic withdrawals in contemporary arms control history: the potential abandonment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This decision, should it materialize, would not merely represent a legal realignment of Iran’s international obligations but would constitute a seismic strategic maneuver—disrupting the global nonproliferation architecture, reshaping diplomatic alliances, and accelerating the regional arms race in a Middle East already teetering under the weight of protracted conflict and fractured diplomacy.

Established in 1970, the NPT rests on three foundational pillars: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and promoting disarmament. Iran’s current commitment to the treaty has remained, at least in formal terms, one of the last remaining legal barriers preventing its open development of nuclear weapons. As of 2025, 191 states remain parties to the NPT, making it the most widely adopted arms control agreement in human history. However, should Iran exit, the symbolic and material damage to this institutional cornerstone may extend well beyond the region.

From a strategic standpoint, Iran’s withdrawal would signal a clear departure from what Jacques E.C. Hymans in Achieving Nuclear Ambitions (2017) characterizes as “nuclear latency”—the state of possessing technological capability without crossing the threshold. Until now, Iran has carefully danced on the periphery of weapons capability, maintaining plausible deniability while accumulating enriched uranium and advanced centrifuge design. Abandoning the NPT, however, would mark an irreversible step from latency to overt preparation, thereby dismantling the carefully curated ambiguity that has served as both shield and sword in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy.

The political ramifications of this decision are likely to be equally profound. In Nuclear Politics (2017) by Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, the authors argue that nuclear proliferation is inherently political—tied not only to the technological constraints of a state but also to its perception of existential threat and diplomatic isolation. With the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Tehran’s calculus has dramatically shifted. The strikes may have paradoxically accelerated the very outcome they purported to prevent, legitimizing within Iran a discourse of resistance that views nuclear armament not as an offensive ambition, but as a necessary deterrent in an anarchic international system.

On the diplomatic front, Iran’s departure would further erode the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with verification and monitoring under the NPT. As explained in Maria Rost Rublee’s Nonproliferation Norms (2017), much of the success of nonproliferation hinges on normative adherence, not merely technical inspections. Should Iran expel inspectors and cease all cooperation with the IAEA—as is anticipated in the wake of withdrawal—other states disillusioned with Western double standards may reconsider the utility of remaining bound by a treaty perceived as discriminatory and selectively enforced.

The security implications are perhaps most destabilizing. Mark Fitzpatrick, a noted arms control expert, argues that such a move would remove Iran’s final legal constraints and free it to pursue weaponization openly. Already, Iran is believed to possess over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, technically just short of the 90% required for a weapon. With the infrastructure for advanced enrichment in place and a cadre of nuclear scientists—despite the assassination of several key figures by Israeli operations—still intact, Fitzpatrick warns that Iran could feasibly complete a weapons program within a year. This timeline finds corroboration in Jeffrey Lewis’ The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States (2018), which, while fictionalized, illustrates how rapidly a state with the technical base and political will can escalate from enrichment to deployment.

Moreover, Iran’s exit from the NPT would not exist in isolation. The regional fallout, especially in terms of proliferation contagion, cannot be overstated. As noted in Shashank Joshi’s The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (2020), the exit of one state from the global arms control regime often triggers anxieties in others, particularly those with existing rivalries. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities should it proceed toward weaponization, and Egypt, long aggrieved by Israel’s undeclared arsenal and exemption from NPT scrutiny, may see an opportunity to challenge the status quo. The fragile balance of deterrence across the Middle East could thus collapse into a cascade of armament and instability.

The global normative order also stands at risk. If the U.S.—itself a founding signatory of the NPT—can target another signatory’s nuclear infrastructure without consequence, and if the IAEA proves unable to enforce compliance or prevent escalation, then the treaty’s legitimacy may begin to unravel. As articulated in Fiona Cunningham’s Nuclear Norms in East Asia (2021), international regimes rely not merely on legal instruments but on perceived fairness and reciprocity. The perception that the NPT regime disproportionately penalizes non-Western states while tolerating exceptions for allies—such as Israel or India—could hasten a broader exodus from the treaty.

Russia’s role as a potential counterbalance on the diplomatic chessboard must also be considered. While Moscow remains a signatory of the NPT and is unlikely to openly assist Iran in developing a nuclear weapon, its alignment with Tehran in international forums—especially at the United Nations Security Council—could serve as a strategic shield against renewed sanctions or enforcement actions. This maneuvering resembles the patterns described in Andrew Futter’s Hacking the Bomb (2018), which explores how nuclear power is now shaped as much by information warfare and diplomatic alliance as by kilotons and centrifuges.

Finally, there is the matter of strategic miscalculation. Should Iran proceed with weaponization and Israel respond with preemptive strikes—potentially supported again by U.S. tactical operations—the possibility of a full-scale regional war would no longer be hypothetical. As Caitlin Talmadge notes in The Dictator’s Army (2017), nuclear breakout scenarios often escalate not through deliberate choice, but through misinterpretation, miscommunication, and the psychology of brinkmanship. Each step away from treaty obligations narrows the window for de-escalation and expands the risk of unintended catastrophe.

In conclusion, Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the NPT represents not merely a response to recent attacks but a profound inflection point in international security architecture. The unraveling of treaty commitments, the weakening of normative frameworks, and the potential for cascading proliferation across the Middle East suggest that the cost of unilateral coercive diplomacy may be greater than the strategic benefits it purports to yield. The global community stands at a precipice, where the pursuit of short-term tactical gains may irreparably fracture the long-standing scaffolding of nuclear restraint.

US President Donald Trump said he does not support regime change in Iran, calling it a path to chaos, and claimed nuclear weapons are “the last thing on Iran’s mind right now.” Israel and Iran are observing a ceasefire after 12 days of hostilities.

Here are the key events as a ceasefire was declared in the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict.

Here’s where things stand on Tuesday, June 24:

Fighting

• A US-brokered ceasefire began at around 04:00 GMT on Tuesday, with Iran halting attacks first and Israel following suit 12 hours later.
• After a rocky start, the ceasefire was holding later in the day, with the missiles and drones silent in both directions for the first time in nearly two weeks.
• The phased 24-hour process was initially violated by both Iran and Israel.
• Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz initially ordered “intense strikes” on Tehran, accusing Iran of violating the truce first, something Iran denies.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin quickly acceded to United States President Donald Trump’s demand to stand down on further attacks.
• Netanyahu’s office said Israel’s military “destroyed a radar installation near Tehran”, claiming it was in retaliation for several earlier Iranian missile strikes.
• Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said 14 missiles were launched against military centres across Israel, adding that the last wave of missiles was carried out minutes before the ceasefire implementation and in response to deadly Israeli strikes.

Casualties and disruptions

• Iran’s Red Crescent Society announced that four of its ambulance workers were killed by the Israeli military. They identified the medics as Mojtaba Maleki, Mehdi Zartaji, Amirhossein Jamshidpour and Yasser Zivari.
• The Iranian judiciary said several employees and visiting family members died as a result of Israel’s attack on Evin Prison on Monday.
• Iran’s Health Ministry said 610 people were killed in Israeli strikes over the past 12 days.
• Israel’s military said a soldier, identified as 18-year-old Eitan Zacks from Beersheba, was killed “as a result of a missile launched from Iran”. Three others died in that attack.
• Israel said its airspace has reopened for emergency flights, while Israel’s flag carrier said it will boost its flight schedule to bring tens of thousands of Israelis back from abroad.
• Syrian airspace reopened after being temporarily closed, Syrian media reported.
• Oman Air said its flight operations also returned to normal following cancellations last night over regional tensions.
• Other countries in the region, including Qatar and Iraq, also reopened their airspace, with flight operators confirming their plans to resume services on Tuesday.

Politics and diplomacy

• Trump said he was “really unhappy” with Israel for violating the truce. He called on Israel to stop dropping bombs and to “bring your pilots home, now!”
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian declared the “end of the 12-day war” with Israel to be a “total victory”.
• Pezeshkian also said his country is ready to resolve issues with the US based on international frameworks.
• Pezeshkian called Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani a day after an Iranian attack on the US military base Al Udeid and expressed “regret”, noting Qatar and its people were not the target of the attack.
• Netanyahu said that Trump “expressed his immense appreciation” for attacking Iran, and that Israel “achieved all of the war’s goals”.
• Netanyahu also said: “We rose like a lion, and our roar shook Tehran. This war will be studied in all the armies of the world. We destroyed the critical facilities in Arak, Natanz, and Isfahan.”
• Trump said in a post on his Truth Social platform that it was a “great honour” to “destroy” Iran’s nuclear facilities, and then “stop the war”.
• Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is more determined to hold on to its nuclear programme after the 12-day Israeli assault, saying “our scientists made massive sacrifices and even lost their lives for this goal”.
• Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh, in remarks to Al Mayadeen TV, said that Iran is alert and ready to respond to any attack.
• Yemen’s Houthi rebels lauded Iran’s “heroic” battle against Israel, with the group’s spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam saying the war was also against “other Western countries that stood with the aggressors”.
• Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China supports Iran in achieving a “genuine ceasefire” after it condemned the US for striking the country’s nuclear sites.
• .British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz met at the NATO summit in The Hague, saying that it was now “time for diplomacy”, as the fragile ceasefire took hold.

In a region that’s seen its fair share of instability, the conflict between Israel and Iran is threatening to create unprecedented chaos.

US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire, just hours after Iran launched missiles towards the US military base in Qatar. That ceasefire is now at risk of falling apart.

Trump urged Israel to “calm down” and demanded that both sides do more to stick to the truce. But will it hold? And where does Iran go from here?

And is there a new balance of power in the Middle East?

Presenter: Imran Khan

Guests:

Dania Thafer – Executive director at the Gulf International Forum

Ellie Geranmayeh – Deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations

Doug Bandow – Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to US President Ronald Reagan

A New Chapter in Global Escalation

Israel’s attack on the heart of Iran in June 2025 was not just the latest episode in the long history of the Middle East conflict. It was a loud signal that great power rivalry is now transforming into an open struggle, with Asia and the Global South as the main arenas of interest. For China, which has always maintained a balance between Iran and Israel, this war is a real test of its diplomatic strategy and national interests.

China: From Balancing to Taking Sides?

China has historically pursued a policy of “dual engagement” in the Middle East—strengthening economic ties with Israel while building a strategic partnership with Iran, especially in the areas of energy and security. However, the 2025 war revealed a significant shift in Beijing’s attitude. Just a day after the Israeli attack, China’s Ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, openly called Israel’s actions a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while urging an end to Israel’s “military adventurism.” This strong statement was reinforced by President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who reiterated their support for Iran’s right to self-defense and rejected further US military involvement.

This policy is not just rhetoric. China is a major buyer of Iranian oil, with more than 80% of Iran’s oil exports going to China—even amid Western sanctions. The 25-year partnership signed in 2021 deepens energy dependence and infrastructure investment, making Iran a key pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. This relationship, economically and geopolitically, positions China as the main defender of Iran’s interests in global forums.

However, this position carries significant risks. China-Israel relations, which previously flourished in the technology and infrastructure sectors, are now experiencing serious rifts. Israel and its Western allies see China’s stance as a bias that undermines trust and narrows the space for dialogue. Iran, on the other hand, views China as an important strategic partner in the face of Western pressure, although it remains aware of the limits of Beijing’s commitment to direct military involvement.

Immediate Impact on Asia and the Global South: Energy, Economics, and Uncertainty

The domino effects of the conflict were immediately felt in Asia and the Global South. The surge in world oil prices—topping $75 per barrel—triggered inflation, increased the fiscal burden on energy-importing countries, and depressed people’s purchasing power. Indonesia, India, and ASEAN countries immediately evacuated residents from conflict zones, strengthened energy reserves, and prepared for economic contingency scenarios.

Asia’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy has now become a strategic vulnerability that cannot be ignored. Any threat to the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for one-third of the world’s oil supply, immediately shakes markets and creates investment uncertainty. For countries in the Global South, energy price volatility means the risk of slowing growth, weakening currencies, and rising living costs—issues that exacerbate inequality and increase the potential for domestic political instability.

China as Mediator: Ambitions, Challenges, and Realities

China is seeking to capitalize on this momentum to assert itself as a global mediator. Beijing has actively offered itself as a mediator, pushed for a ceasefire, and called for multilateral dialogue in forums such as the UN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In its official narrative and state media editorials, China has emphasized the importance of a political solution, respect for sovereignty, and rejection of Western-style “unilateral intervention.”

However, the effectiveness of China’s mediation role faces real limitations. China’s influence over Israel is very limited, given Tel Aviv’s closeness to Washington and skepticism of Beijing’s neutrality. On the other hand, China’s over-involvement risks provoking a confrontation with the United States, which remains the dominant player in the Middle East. The reality on the ground shows that while China has been able to construct a narrative as a new counterbalance, its ability to truly change the dynamics of the conflict is still constrained by its limited military and political leverage.

Strategic Implications: Global Polarization and the Future of Asia

The Iran-Israel conflict deepens global polarization between Israel’s pro-Israel bloc (the US and its Western allies) and Iran’s pro-Iran bloc (China, Russia, and much of the Global South). Asian and Global South countries are now faced with a strategic dilemma: balancing relations with the two great powers without getting caught up in a rivalry that could undermine regional stability.

For China, this conflict is a test of its ambition to become a leader of the Global South and a counterweight to Western dominance. Beijing’s firm stance in defending the principle of sovereignty and rejecting military intervention is a strong message to developing countries that have long felt marginalized in the global order. However, the challenge ahead is how to transform this diplomatic capital into real influence in resolving conflicts and building inclusive collective security mechanisms.

Conclusion: Asia and the Global South as Deciders of the Future

The Iran-Israel conflict and China’s response mark a new chapter in world geopolitics. Asia and the Global South are no longer spectators, but rather determiners of the future of the global order. By strengthening solidarity, policy innovation, and collective diplomacy, developing countries can take a greater role in maintaining world peace and prosperity. The challenges are great, but the opportunities to build a more inclusive and equitable world order are now wide open—and China, along with Asia and the Global South, is at the center of that change.

Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani called for peace and diplomacy less than 24 hours after Iran attempted strikes on the US’s Al Udeid Air Base located in the country. But he said a “scar” had been inflicted on Qatar’s regional relationship with Iran.

The ceasefire between Israel and Iran is already showing signs of strain – and has triggered frustration, and a televised expletive, from United States President Donald Trump, who accused Israel of undermining the deal just hours after its announcement.

The ceasefire, brokered by the US and Qatar, came into effect late Monday following days of intensive missile barrages between the two foes. Israel’s last wave of strikes targeted Iranian military infrastructure near Isfahan, prompting retaliatory drone launches by Tehran.

Iran violated the ceasefire, “but Israel violated it too”, Trump told reporters on the White House’s South Lawn on Tuesday as he departed for the NATO summit.

“So I’m not happy with them. I’m not happy with Iran either. But I’m really unhappy if Israel is going out this morning.”

“I’ve got to get Israel to calm down,” he said. “Israel, as soon as we made the deal, they came out and dropped a load of bombs, the likes of which I’ve never seen before.”

As he prepared to head to a NATO summit in The Hague in the Netherlands, Trump’s anger flared on the White House Lawn: “We have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the f*** they’re doing.”

A day earlier, Trump boasted on his Truth Social app that “the Ceasefire is in effect!”

“ISRAEL is not going to attack Iran. All planes will turn around and head home, while doing a friendly ‘Plane Wave’ to Iran. Nobody will be hurt,” Trump wrote.

Trump’s unusually public display of anger at Israel saw the US leader apparently trying to force his ally to call off warplanes in real time on Tuesday.

Earlier the same morning, he had posted on Truth Social: “ISRAEL. DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS” – without it being clear which bombs he was referring to.

“IF YOU DO IT IS A MAJOR VIOLATION. BRING YOUR PILOTS HOME, NOW!”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemed to quickly accede, with his office saying in a statement on Tuesday that Israel still carried out one more attack near Tehran after Trump’s appeal, but is refraining from “further strikes”.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz had said earlier on Tuesday that he had ordered the military to mount new strikes on targets in Tehran in response to what he claimed were Iranian missiles fired in a “blatant violation” of the ceasefire.

Iran denied launching any missiles and said Israel’s attacks had continued for an hour and a half beyond the time the ceasefire was meant to start.

For his part, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that his country would not fire at Israel if it was not fired upon, but that a “final decision on the cessation of our military operations will be made later”.

Despite the rocky start, Trump voiced support for the ceasefire itself, clarifying he is not seeking regime change in Iran, after some mixed messaging in recent days, and insisting that the ceasefire remains in effect.

If it holds, the truce would be a big political win for Trump in the wake of his risky gamble to send US bombers over the weekend to attack three nuclear facilities in Iran that Israel and the United States claim were being used to build an atomic bomb in secret.

US intelligence and the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog had previously recorded no indication Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.

Reporting from Tehran, Al Jazeera’s Ali Hashem said Iranian officials appeared to welcome Trump’s remarks, viewing them as a potential opening for diplomatic engagement.

“It might give the impression that Trump is serious about this ceasefire,” Hashem said.

In Washington, Al Jazeera’s Phil Lavelle, said Trump is feeling “quite annoyed” at and perhaps “betrayed” by Netanyahu violating the ceasefire.

“He was angry with both Israel and Iran. But you could really tell some of the extra anger there, the extra fury was aimed at Israel,” Lavelle said.

The US leader had said the truce would be a phased 24-hour process beginning at about 04:00 GMT Tuesday, with Iran unilaterally halting all operations first. He said Israel would follow suit 12 hours later.

Israel has been bombing Iran in an offensive that began June 13. The US joined the attack with a mission starting overnight Friday to Saturday against the deeply-buried and hard-to-access Fordow complex and two other sites.

Iranian officials say more than 400 people have been killed in air strikes. Retaliatory missile strikes have killed 28 people in Israel, the first time large numbers of Iranian missiles have penetrated – and on a daily basis – its much vaunted air defence systems, which mainly the US has provided.

WASHINGTON — President Trump isn’t the first president to order military strikes without congressional approval. But his decision to bomb Iran comes at a uniquely volatile moment — both at home and abroad.

Overseas, the U.S. risks deeper entanglement in the Middle East if fighting erupts again between Israel and Iran. At home, Trump continues to sidestep oversight, showing little regard for checks and balances.

His move has reignited a decades-old debate over the War Powers Act, a law passed in the early 1970s meant to divide authority over military action between Congress and the president. Critics say Trump violated the act by striking with little input from Congress, while supporters argue he responded to an imminent threat and is looking to avoid prolonged conflict.

Even after Trump announced late Monday that a “complete and total ceasefire” between Israel and Iran would take effect over the next 24 hours, tensions remained high in Congress over Trump’s action. A vote is expected in the Senate later this week on a Democratic Iran war powers resolution that is meant to place a check on Trump when it comes to further entanglement with Iran.

Here’s a closer look at what the act does and doesn’t do, how past presidents have tested it and how Congress plans to respond:

Dividing war powers between Congress and the president

Passed in the wake of American involvement in Vietnam, the War Powers Resolution prescribes how the president should work with lawmakers to deploy troops if Congress hasn’t already issued a declaration of war.

It states that the framers of the Constitution intended for Congress and the President to use its “collective judgement” to send troops into “hostilities.” The War Powers Resolution calls for the president “in every possible instance” to “consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces.”

But when Congress enacted the law, “it didn’t install any hard requirements, and it provided a lot of outs,” said Scott Anderson, a fellow at the Brookings Institution.

“Habitual practice for presidents in the last few decades has been to minimally — almost not at all — consult with Congress on a lot of military action,” Anderson said. And “the language of the statute is so vague and open-ended that it’s hard to say it’s in clear contradiction” to the War Powers Resolution.

Unless a Declaration of War has already been passed or Congress has authorized deploying forces, the president has 48 hours after deploying troops to send a written report to congressional leadership explaining the decision. Trump did so on Monday, sending Congress a letter that said strikes on Iran over the weekend were “limited in scope and purpose” and “designed to minimize casualties, deter future attacks and limit the risk of escalation.”

In March, when Trump ordered airstrikes in Houthi-held areas in Yemen, he wrote a letter to congressional leadership explaining his rationale and reviewing his orders to the Department of Defense. President Biden wrote nearly 20 letters citing the War Powers Resolution during his term.

If Congress doesn’t authorize further action within 60 to 90 days, the resolution requires that the president “terminate any use” of the armed forces. “That’s the hard requirement of the War Powers Resolution,” Anderson said.

How past presidents have used it

Congress hasn’t declared war on another country since World War II, but U.S. presidents have filed scores of reports pursuant to the War Powers Resolution since it was enacted in 1973, over President Nixon’s veto.

Presidents have seized upon some of the vague wording in the War Powers Resolution to justify their actions abroad. In 1980, for example, Jimmy Carter argued that attempting to rescue hostages from Iran didn’t require a consultation with Congress, since it wasn’t an act of war, according to the Congressional Research Service.

President George W. Bush invoked war powers in the weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and persuaded Congress to approve an authorization for the use of military force against Iraq in 2002.

Throughout his presidency, President Obama faced pressure to cease operations in Libya after 90 days. But his administration argued that the U.S. use of airpower in Libya didn’t rise to the level of “hostilities” set forth in the War Powers Resolution.

What Congress is doing now

Trump’s actions in Iran have drawn the loudest praise from the right and the sharpest rebukes from the left. But the response hasn’t broken cleanly along party lines.

Daily developments have also complicated matters. Trump on Sunday raised the possibility of a change in leadership in Iran, before on Monday announcing that Israel and Iran had agreed to a “complete and total” ceasefire to be phased in over the next 24 hours.

Nevertheless, the Senate could vote as soon as this week on a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities against Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.

Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., the bill’s sponsor, told reporters Monday — prior to the ceasefire announcement — that the vote could come “as early as Wednesday, as late as Friday.” He expects bipartisan backing, though support is still coming together ahead of a classified briefing for senators on Tuesday.

“There will be Republicans who will support it,” Kaine said. “Exactly how many, I don’t know.”

He added that, “this is as fluid a vote as I’ve been involved with during my time here, because the facts are changing every day.”

Passing the resolution could prove difficult, especially with Republicans praising Trump after news of the ceasefire broke. Even prior to that, Senate Majority Leader John Thune, R-S.D., defended Trump’s actions on Monday and said he’s operating within his authority.

“There’s always a tension between Congress’ power to declare war and the president’s power as commander in chief,” said Sen. John Kennedy, R-La. “But I think the White House contacted its people, as many people as they could.”

A similar bipartisan resolution in the House — led by Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna and Republican Rep. Thomas Massie — could follow soon, although Massie signaled Monday that he may no longer pursue it if peace has been reached.

Khanna was undeterred.

“In case of a conflict in the future, we need to be on record saying no offensive war in Iran without prior authorization,” Khanna said. “We still need a vote.”

Askarinam and Cappelletti write for the Associated Press. AP writers Mary Clare Jalonick and Matt Brown contributed to this report.

What did Israel accomplish in Iran after 11 days of incessant bombing? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed in his statement acknowledging the ceasefire that the Israeli goals have been achieved. Such an assertion seems problematic, to say the least.

At the start of the short-lived war, he declared two goals: “decapitating the nuclear programme” and “regime change”.

Was the nuclear programme decapitated? The answer is likely negative. It seems that Iran transported fissionable material out of the Fordow facility attacked by the United States. This stockpile is the most important part of the nuclear programme, so “decapitation” seems to have failed.

What damage, if any, did Israel inflict on the Iranian nuclear programme? That is also unclear. Israel managed to persuade the US to attack Iranian nuclear facilities using bunker-busting bombs, Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), but the US did little else to help the Israeli offensive. The extent of destruction would be hard to evaluate since Iran is unlikely to grant outside access.

Has Israel generated “regime change” in Iran? The brief answer is that it has very much achieved the opposite. Israel attempted to trigger an uprising against the regime by killing military leaders of Iran’s various security structures. This strategy is based on the firm Israeli belief that the best way to destabilise an enemy is through assassinations of senior leaders. This has never worked. The only possible exception was the effect Hassan Nasrallah’s death had on Hezbollah in Lebanon, but that had a great deal to do with internal Lebanese political dynamics. In all other cases, Israeli assassinations have failed to create any major political change.

In the case of Iran, the assassinations rallied the people around the government. Israel assassinated the senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), perhaps the most powerful element in current Iranian politics, but also one of the most hated by the Iranian public. Regardless, many Iranians who consider themselves staunch opponents of the Islamic Republic and especially of the IRGC found themselves supporting it. Iranians saw Iran in its entirety under attack and not just “the regime”.

Israel’s attempts to bomb “regime symbols” only made the situation worse. It attempted to spin its air strikes on Evin Prison, infamous for the torture of political prisoners, as a contribution to the struggle of the Iranian people against the repression of the Islamic Republic. But Israel’s bombs effectively worsened the situation of the prisoners, as the authorities moved many of them to unknown locations.

Bombing the “Israel doomsday clock”, which Israelis often employ as a demonstration of Iran’s commitment to Israel’s destruction, was simply pathetic.

Israel’s bombing of the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB was also absurd. Israel claimed it was curtailing the regime’s attempt to spread propaganda. As many Israelis pointed out, this bombing gave the Iranians the vindication they needed to threaten Israeli television stations as well.

If Israel did not manage to achieve its stated war goals, did it at least manage to rally the world behind it, to make the public forget about Gaza and recast Israel again as fighting the good fight? That seems dubitable at best. True, President Donald Trump and the US did strike Iranian nuclear facilities. By doing so, they violated several major rules of international law. This is likely to have long-term implications. However, Trump did not join the war alongside Israel. Immediately after the strike, the strategic bombers returned to the US.

Before and after carrying out the bombing, Trump iterated and reiterated his desire for a deal between the US and Iran, one that may also include Israel. It seems likely that the US president assisted Israel to serve his own interests as well as those of his allies in the Gulf.

While several world leaders, most notably German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, were quick to support the US strikes and “Israel’s right to defend itself”, no one adopted Israel’s stringent list of demands, which included that  Iran should not be able to enrich uranium at all.

The world returned to the formula of “no nuclear weapon”, with which Iran had already announced it was willing to comply.

When it comes to the operational development of the Middle East, the world appears to find Iran a legitimate partner for doing business. This is a loss for Israel and a victory for Iran.

The very real damage to the Israeli heartland should also be considered. Israel achieved aerial dominance over Iran very quickly and struck almost at will. Iranian missiles, however, repeatedly managed to penetrate the famed Israeli air defence system, strike at the heart of Israel and across the entire country, and bring it to a standstill while inflicting an unprecedented number of casualties as well as massive destruction. Israel was running low on interceptor missiles without hopes of immediate replenishment. The Israeli economy was quickly grinding to a halt. This was another triumph for Iran.

Iran emerged from the war bruised and bombed, suffering hundreds of casualties and real damage from incessant bombing around the country. But the Islamic Republic did not crumble, even when facing a massive Israeli force.

Iranian missiles hit home, Iran’s image was not tarnished (it was seen by most of the world as a victim of an Israeli attack), and Iran’s options for response were not severely constrained. Iran successfully de-escalated by warning in advance about its “retaliation” for the US strike on its military base in Qatar.

Iran was powerful enough to convince Trump to warn Israel not to attack after the ceasefire appeared to have been violated. Iran emerged as it prefers to emerge – still standing, and with potential for the future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.