AlQaeda

Is Mali about to fall to al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM? | Armed Groups News

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

Recommended Stories

list of 4 itemsend of list

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

Mali
People ride on top of a minibus, a form of public transport, amid ongoing fuel shortages caused by a blockade imposed by al Qaeda-linked fighters in early September, in Bamako, Mali, on October 31, 2025 [Reuters]

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

Heads of state of Mali's Assimi Goita, Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore
Heads of state of Mali’s Assimi Goita, Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tchiani and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore pose for photographs during the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger, July 6, 2024 [Mahamadou Hamidou/Reuters]

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Mali fuel crisis
A person walks past cars parked on the roadside, amid ongoing fuel shortages caused by a blockade imposed by al-Qaeda-linked fighters in early September, in Bamako, Mali, October 31, 2025 [Reuters]

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

Agreements between the group and local leaders have reportedly already been signed in several towns across Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, in which the group agrees to end its siege in return for the communities agreeing to JNIM rules, taxes, and noncooperation with the military.

Source link

State Department increases reward for info on al-Qaeda leader to $10M

The State Department is offering a $10 million reward for information identifying or locating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Sa-ad Bin Atef al-Awlaki. Image Courtesy of the State Department

July 29 (UPI) — The State Department has increased to $10 million its reward for information leading to the identification or location of the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Sa’ad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the man the State Department says leads AQAP and has called for attacks against the United States and its allies.

Al-Awlaki also has led AQAP attacks against the United States and kidnapped Americans and other Westerners in Yemen in his prior role as the amir of the Shabwah province in Yemen, according to a State Department news release issued on Tuesday.

The State Department previously offered a $6 million reward for information identifying or locating al-Awlaki’s whereabouts via the Rewards for Justice program.

Al-Awlaki also goes by the names Sa’d Muhammad Atif and Jalaal al-Sa-idi and was born in Yemen sometime between 1978 and 1983.

He stands 5’6″ and has a thin build, according to the State Department.

The State Department also is offering rewards of $5 million and $4 million, respectively, for information leading to the identification or location of Ibrahim al-Banna and Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi.

Al-Banna and al-Qosi are part of the leadership team that assists al-Awlaki in his role as the leader of AQAP.

Anyone with information on al-Awlaki, al-Banna or al-Qosi can contact the Rewards for Justice office via Telegram, Signal or WhatsApp at +1202-702-7843.

Those using a Tor browser also can contact the Rewards for Justice’s Tor-based tipline at he5dybnt7sr6cm32xt77pazmtm65flqy6irivtflruqfc5ep7eiodiad.onion.

Congress created the Rewards for Justice program in 1984, which is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

The program offers rewards for information that helps protect American lives, U.S. interests and national security.

Since its inception, Rewards for Justice has paid out more than $250 million in rewards to more than 125 people who provided information that helped protect U.S. citizens and end threats to national security.

President Donald Trump leaves at the White House, Washington, on July 25, 2025. He is due to visit Scotland for a four-day visit. Photo by Will Oliver/UPI | License Photo

Source link

How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups

Priya Sippy & Jacob Boswall

BBC News & BBC Monitoring

Al-Zallaqa JNIM fighters train in an undisclosed location in West Africa's Sahel region.Al-Zallaqa

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the main group behind a surge in militant jihadist attacks sweeping across several West African nations, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

On 1 July, the group said it had carried out a major coordinated attack on seven military locations in western Mali, including near the borders with Senegal and Mauritania.

There is growing concern about the impact JNIM could have on the stability of the region.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have struggled to contain the violence – and this is one of the factors that contributed to several military coups in the three Sahel countries over the last five years.

But like the civilian governments they replaced, the juntas are seemingly unable to stem the growing jihadist threat, especially from JNIM.

What is JNIM?

JNIM has become one of Africa’s deadliest jihadist groups within the space of just a few years.

It was formed in Mali in 2017, as a coalition of five jihadist militant groups:

  • Ansar Dine
  • Katibat Macina
  • Al-Mourabitoun
  • Ansar al-Islam
  • The Sahara branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

These groups started collaborating after the French military pushed back several jihadist and separatist organisations that were operating in northern Mali in 2012. Eventually, the leaders of the groups came together to create JNIM.

In recent years, they have expanded geographically, establishing new areas of operation.

JNIM is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Malian diplomat who belongs to the Tuareg ethnic group. He was at the helm of the Tuareg uprising against the Malian government in 2012 which sought to establish an independent state for the Tuareg people called Azawad. Deputy leader Amadou Koufa is from the Fulani community.

Analysts believe the central leadership helps guide local branches which operate across the Sahel region of West Africa.

While it is difficult to know exactly how many fighters there are in JNIM’s ranks, or how many have recently been recruited, experts suggest it could be several thousand – mostly young men and boys who lack other economic opportunities in one of the poorest regions in the world.

What does JNIM want?

The group rejects the authority of the Sahel governments, seeking to impose its strict interpretation of Islam and Sharia in the areas where it operates.

Analysts say that in some areas, JNIM has been known to impose strict dress codes, implement bans against music and smoking, order men to grow beards and prevent women from being in public spaces alone.

This version of Islam can be at odds with the religion as practised by local communities, says Yvan Guichaoua, a senior researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies.

“These practices are clearly breaking from established practices and certainly not very popular,” he says.

“But whether it’s attractive or not, also depends on what the state is able to deliver, and there has been a lot of disappointment in what the state has been doing for the past years.”

Disillusionment with the secular justice system can make the introduction of Sharia courts appealing to some.

Where does JNIM operate?

After its beginnings in central and northern Mali, JNIM rapidly expanded its reach. While its strongholds are in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, JNIM has also carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and at one point Ivory Coast.

It is now operational throughout Mali and 11 of Burkina Faso’s 13 regions, according to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc), a civil society organisation.

In the last year, Burkina Faso has become the epicentre of the group’s activities – predominately the northern and eastern border regions. This is, in part, because of divisions and defections in the country’s military as well as how deeply embedded the militants are in the local communities, according to Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst for security consultancy firm Control Risk.

“JNIM have an ability to embed in local communities or to be able to use local grievances as a means of recruiting or winning sympathy towards their cause,” she told the BBC.

Are JNIM attacks increasing in scale?

In recent months violent incidents have spiked in Burkina Faso to previously unseen levels, according to analysis from BBC Monitoring’s jihadist media team. Major attacks have also recently been carried out in Mali, Niger and Benin.

In the first half of 2025, JNIM said it carried out over 280 attacks in Burkina Faso – double the number for the same period in 2024, according to data verified by the BBC.

The group has claimed to have killed almost 1,000 people across the Sahel since April, most of them members of the security force or militias fighting alongside government forces, according to BBC Monitoring data.

Almost 800 of these have been in Burkina Faso alone. Casualties in Mali were the next highest (117) and Benin (74).

“The frequency of attacks in June is just unheard of so far,” says Mr Guichaoua. “They have really stepped up their activities in the past weeks.”

The militants use a variety of tactics designed to cause maximum disruption, Ms Ochieng explains.

“They plant IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on key roads, and have long-range capabilities.

“They [also] target security forces in military bases, so a lot of their weapons come from that. They have also attacked civilians – in instances where communities are perceived to be cooperating with the government.”

Starlink – a company owned by Elon Musk which provides internet via satellites – has also been exploited by groups like JNIM to enhance their capabilities, according to a recent report by Gi-Toc.

The company provides high-speed internet where regular mobile networks are unavailable or unreliable.

Militant groups smuggle Starlink devices into the country along well-established contraband routes, G-toch says.

“Starlink has made it much easier for [militant groups] to plan and execute attacks, share intelligence, recruit members, carry out financial transactions and maintain contacts with their commanders even during active conflict,” an analyst from Gi-Toc told the BBC’s Focus on Africa podcast.

The BBC has contacted Starlink for comment.

How is JNIM funded?

The group has multiple sources of income.

At one time in Mali, funds were raised through kidnapping foreigners for ransom but few remain in the country because of the deteriorating security situation.

Cattle-rustling has now become a major source of income, according to an analyst from Gi-Toc. They did not want to be named as it could risk their safety in Mali.

“Mali is a big exporter of cattle so it’s easy for them to steal animals and sell them,” the analyst said.

Research by Gi-Toc shows that in one year in just one district of Mali, JNIM made $770,000 (£570,000) from livestock. Based on this figure, JNIM could be earning millions of dollars from cattle theft.

JNIM also imposes various taxes, according to experts.

“They tax the gold, but basically tax anything that goes through their territory, whether that’s listed goods or illicit goods,” Gi-Toc says.

“There can be an extortion type of tax, where JNIM tell citizens they need to pay in return for protection.”

The militants have also been known to set up blockades, at which people must pay to leave and enter the area, according to Ms Ochieng.

What about efforts to fight them?

France’s armed forces were on the ground supporting the government in Mali for almost a decade – with over 4,000 troops stationed across the Sahel region fighting groups that went on to form JNIM, as well as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

While they had some initial success in 2013 and 2014, reclaiming territory from the militants and killing several senior commanders, this did not stop JNIM’s growth after it was formed.

“Counterinsurgency efforts have failed so far because of this idea that JNIM can be beaten militarily, but it is only through negotiation that the group will end,” Gi-Toc’s analyst suggested.

In 2014, Sahelian countries banded together to form the G5 Sahel Task Force, a 5,000-strong group of international troops. However, over the past couple of years, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn, undermining the task force’s ability to tackle the insurgency.

Minusma, the UN peacekeeping force – while not a counter-insurgency effort – was also in Mali for a decade to support efforts, however it left the country at the end of 2024.

What impact have military coups had on JNIM?

A line graph showing the number of attacks 2017-2024, with the various coups marked. The number increases steadily until 2023 when it flattens out

Military coups took place in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023.

Poor governance under the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger subsequently has allowed militant groups like JNIM to flourish, according to analysts.

These juntas were swift to tell French troops to leave, replacing them with Russian support and a joint force formed by the three Sahelian countries.

Though Russian paramilitary group Wagner has withdrawn its troops from Mali entirely, Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in place.

In Burkina Faso, a so-called “volunteer” army, launched in 2020 before the military takeover, is one strategy being used to fight militants. Junta leader Ibrahim Traoré has said he wants to recruit 50,000 fighters.

But experts say many of these volunteers are conscripted by force. Inadequate training means they often suffer heavy casualties. They are also often a target for JNIM attacks.

The military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali have also been accused by human rights organisations of committing atrocities against civilians, particularly ethnic Fulanis. Human rights group say the government often conflates the Fulani community with Islamist armed groups, which has furthered hampered peace efforts.

Between January 2024 and March 2025, the military government and their Russian allies were responsible for 1,486 civilian casualties in Mali, according to Gi-Toc.

This extreme violence against civilians has generated anger towards the government, fuelling further recruitment for JNIM.

You may also be interested in:

Getty Images/BBC A woman looking at her mobile phone and the graphic BBC News AfricaGetty Images/BBC

Source link

Mali army says 80 fighters killed after earlier al-Qaeda linked attacks | Conflict News

An al-Qaeda affiliate earlier claimed responsibility for ‘coordinated and high-quality attacks’ in the country.

Mali’s armed forces have killed 80 fighters in response to a series of simultaneous and coordinated attacks on military posts across the country, according to a video statement released by the military.

“The enemy suffered significant losses in every location where they engaged with the security and defence forces,” Souleymane Dembele, the army’s spokesperson, said in a special bulletin broadcast on the armed forces’ television channel, as visuals of fallen rebels, their weapons, motorbikes, and vehicles were displayed.

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) earlier claimed responsibility for “coordinated and high-quality attacks”, saying it had taken control of three barracks and dozens of military positions.

Mali’s armed forces said the attacks took place in seven towns in the central and western regions of the West African country.

The incidents bore the hallmarks of other recent operations by the group, which has conducted similar assaults on military positions in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Mali, governed by a military government since 2020, has for more than a decade fought violent groups linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, while contending with a longer history of Tuareg-led rebellions in the north.

The attacks on Tuesday targeted Diboli in western Mali near the border with Senegal, and the nearby towns of Kayes and Sandere. There were also attacks in Nioro du Sahel and Gogoui, northwest of the capital Bamako near the border with Mauritania, and in Molodo and Niono in central Mali, “all struck by shellfire”, the army’s statement said.

Residents and a local politician confirmed the attacks in at least four towns.

“We woke up in shock this morning. There’s gunfire, and from my house I can see smoke billowing towards the governor’s residence,” one resident in the city of Kayes said.

The person described the gunfire as “intense” while another reported sheltering at home while the assault raged on.

Elsewhere, a local political official wrote on Facebook that “the region of Nioro woke up in shock” and that the towns of Nioro, Sandare and Gogui had been targeted.

Source link

Yemen’s al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk over Israel’s war on Gaza | Al-Qaeda News

Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, who is wanted by the US, challenges Houthi dominance of Arab and Muslim world’s resistance movement.

The leader of al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch has targeted US President Donald Trump and tech billionaire Elon Musk over United States backing for Israel’s ongoing war on the Gaza Strip and its besieged Palestinian population.

“There are no red lines after what happened and is happening to our people in Gaza,” said Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki in a half-hour video message that was spread online Saturday by supporters of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemeni branch of the armed group.

“Reciprocity is legitimate,” he said.

Al-Awlaki’s video message also included calls for so-called lone wolves to assassinate leaders in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Arab states over the war, which has decimated Gaza, killing at least 54,772 Palestinians over the past 20 months.

The message featured images of Trump and Musk, US Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, as well as logos of Musk’s businesses – including electric carmaker Tesla.

Born in 2009 from the merger of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi factions, AQAP is completely distinct from Yemen’s Houthi rebel group, which controls most of the country and agreed to a ceasefire with the US earlier this month.

AQAP grew and developed amid the chaos of Yemen’s war, which has pitted the Houthis against a Saudi-led coalition backing the government since 2015.

Al-Awlaki became the group’s leader in 2024, replacing predecessor Khalid Batarfi, who died that year.

He already has a $6m US bounty on his head, having, as Washington puts it, “publicly called for attacks against the United States and its allies”.

Though believed to be weakened in recent years due to infighting and suspected US drone strikes killing its leaders, the group had been considered the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda still operating since the US killing of founder Osama bin Laden in 2011.

United Nations experts estimate AQAP has between 3,000 and 4,000 active fighters and passive members, claiming that it raises money by robbing banks and money exchange shops, as well as by smuggling weapons, counterfeiting currencies and conducting ransom operations.

The Houthis have previously denied working with AQAP, though the latter’s targeting of the Houthis has dropped in recent years, while its fighters keep attacking the Saudi-led coalition forces.

Now, with its focus on Israel’s war on Gaza, AQAP appears to be following the lead of the Houthi group, which has launched missile attacks on Israel and targeted commercial vessels moving through the Red Sea in solidarity with Palestinians under Israeli fire.

“As the Houthis gain popularity as leaders of the ‘Arab and Muslim world’s resistance’ against Israel, al-Awlaki seeks to challenge their dominance by presenting himself as equally concerned about the situation in Gaza,” said Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemen expert with the Basha Report risk advisory firm.

“For a national security and foreign policy community increasingly disengaged from Yemen, this video is a clear reminder: Yemen still matters,” he said.

Source link

Al-Qaeda affiliate claims 200 soldiers killed in Burkina Faso attack | Armed Groups News

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) claims attack on Djibo military outpost, SITE Intelligence Group says.

An al-Qaeda affiliate has claimed it killed 200 soldiers in an attack on a Burkina Faso army base this week, according to an NGO that tracks armed groups’ online activity.

The base in the northern town of Djibo came under attack on Sunday morning, and a police station and market were also targeted, security sources told the news agency Reuters. Although there was no official toll, three Djibo residents told Reuters that dozens of soldiers and civilians were killed.

Al Jazeera was not able to independently verify the death toll. A Burkina Faso military source told Al Jazeera that the armed group was exaggerating the number of casualties.

The United States-based SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks online activity of armed groups, said Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) made the claim in a formal statement.

“The operation comes amid increased JNIM activity in Burkina Faso over the past month inflicting a high number of casualties,” SITE said.

The organisation previously said Ousmane Dicko, head of JNIM in Burkina Faso, had appeared in a video urging residents of Djibo to leave the town for their own safety.

Reporting from Dakar, Senegal, Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque said the attack took place over a number of days.

“One of the major military outposts that was supposed to protect this town of about 200,000 people was razed to the ground, such was the firepower of the armed groups,” said Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque, reporting from Senegal, Dakar.

“This is one of the deadliest attacks in Burkina Faso, and it comes just as Ibrahim Traore [Burkina Faso’s military leader] has been saying that the country has been gaining territory, encouraging people to go back to their homes, but this latest attack proves the opposite,” said Haque.

A video circulating on social media from the al-Qaeda affiliate warned people to leave their homes and said it would seize more territories.

“What we’re seeing here is the pivot point where these armed groups that normally attack villages are now trying to take over towns. It’s a major blow for Burkina Faso’s armed forces,” Haque said, noting the attacks come just as Traore was visiting Russia, asking President Vladimir Putin for more training and arms to fight off armed groups.

JNIM claimed responsibility for another assault this week targeting a military post in Burkina Faso’s northern Loroum province in which the group said 60 soldiers were killed, according to SITE.

The attacks highlight the difficulties the three Sahel nations of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, ruled by military leaders, are facing in containing the armed groups.

Burkina Faso authorities have not commented on the latest attacks.

A notable attack occurred in the Burkina town of Sole, where JNIM fighters raided the army military post and killed soldiers, SITE Intelligence said, without specifying on which day it took place.

A Military government took power in Burkina Faso in 2022, but they have largely failed to provide stability, as more than 60 percent of the country is estimated to be outside government control.

Source link