even year

I may be revealing a secret cherished by columnists the world over, but I admit that among the columns we relish writing the most fall into the “I told you so” genre.

Case in point: In April last year, in a column about the gambling mess ensnaring Shohei Ohtani’s then-interpreter, I warned that the pro sports leagues’ enthusiastic embrace of betting would inevitably produce a major scandal.

“It might not surface in the next months or even years,” I wrote, “but it will happen.”

The calendar, as it turned out, ticked over at 19 months. Last Thursday, federal prosecutors charged National Basketball Assn. player Terry Rozier and former NBA player and assistant coach Damon Jones with fraud and money laundering in connection with a scheme to fix bets on NBA games. Portland Trail Blazers head coach Chauncey Billups was charged in a separate indictment linking him to a Mafia scheme to fix poker games; Jones was also named in that indictment.

The NBA has placed Billups and Rozier on leave. They’re both due to appear in federal court in Brooklyn over the next few weeks to enter pleas, though both have asserted their innocence.

It may not be easy for the league to wash its hands of this mess. All the professional sports leagues spent years shunning gambling as a threat to their public image of integrity before embracing the siren call of big-time sports betting, bringing gambling companies and their ever-increasing customer base into their tents. But the NBA was ahead of the crowd.

In a 2014 op-ed, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver effectively cried “uncle” in the league’s battle against gambling.

“For more than two decades,” he wrote, “the National Basketball Association has opposed the expansion of legal sports betting, as have the other major professional sports leagues in the United States.” The leagues supported a 1992 federal law prohibiting sports betting except in grandfathered venues, such as Las Vegas.

They took a stern position against players and personnel caught betting on their games and their sports, dating to 1919 and the so-called Black Sox scandal, in which eight members of the Chicago White Sox were accused of throwing the World Series for the benefit of a gambling ring. Major League Baseball hired an austere federal judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, as its commissioner and gave him unchecked authority to clean up the game. He banned the eight players from baseball forever.

In recent times, Silver observed in his op-ed, the American appetite for sports betting has only risen. Accordingly, he called for legalizing the practice so it could be “brought out of the underground and into the sunlight where it can be appropriately monitored and regulated.”

(The 1992 law was overturned by the Supreme Court, and legalized sports betting spread coast to coast.)

Given the subsequent developments, one can tag Silver for his childlike innocence in counting on the government to regulate an industry collecting billions of dollars a year from millions of users while operating with a legal imprimatur.

Silver wrote that among his “most important responsibilities as commissioner of the N.B.A. is to protect the integrity of professional basketball and preserve public confidence in the league and our sport.”

When I asked the NBA if Silver has had second thoughts about his 2014 op-ed, the league replied, “We continue to believe that a legal, regulated, and monitored sports betting market is far superior to an illegal one operating underground,” and suggested that a single federal regulator would be preferable to the existing state-by-state patchwork, though the activities alleged in the federal indictments almost surely would be crimes in any state. Silver did say during a broadcast interview Friday that the case gave him “a pit in my stomach.”

The league’s ability to monitor the behavior of its own people is questionable. Consider a March 23, 2024, Charlotte Hornets game against the New Orleans Pelicans. According to the indictment, Rozier let the gambling conspirators know that he would take himself out of the game early, allowing them to profit from bets that his stats would fall short of bookmakers’ expectations.

The NBA, alerted by sports wagering companies to “aberrational behavior” involving Rozier in the game, investigated but later said it could find any “violation of NBA rules.”

The NBA can hardly claim to have been blindsided by the new indictments. Only last year, another federal gambling case erupted involving NBA games.

In that case, prosecutors alleged that a gambler named Ammar Awawdeh forced then-Toronto Raptors player Jontay Porter to take himself out of a game early. That led gamblers who knew of the arrangement to bet that his stats for the game would fall short of expectations; those insiders made more than $100,000 on their bets, the prosecutors charged.

According to text messages filed with the 2024 indictments, Awawdeh acknowledged “forcing” Porter to participate in the scheme to help clear some of his gambling debts.

Awawdeh engaged in plea negotiations in the case, but the outcome couldn’t be determined. Porter pleaded guilty to related federal fraud charges, and is scheduled to be sentenced in December. The NBA has banned Porter for life.

Awawdeh was also named in last week’s indictment over the alleged poker scam.

In recent years, the pro leagues have cozied up to the gambling industry, claiming that their interest is merely “fan engagement” — that is, keeping TV viewers in front of their sets even during blowout games.

Only 11 states bar sports gambling today. They include the customary anti-gambling holdouts Utah and Hawaii, and California, where ballot measures to legalize sports gambling were defeated in 2022. As I mentioned in 2024, the perils of this expansion are manifest.

They’ve created a new underclass of gambling addicts while largely failing to fulfill their advocates’ assurances that state-sponsored and regulated gambling would produce a new, risk-free revenue stream for state and local budgets. The outcomes of some games have come under suspicion even where no evidence of fixing has been found.

The leagues have gone beyond just tolerating gambling; they’ve made partnership and sponsorship deals with the major sports gambling companies. The two leading companies, FanDuel and DraftKings, are official corporate gambling partners of the NBA, National Football League and Major League Baseball.

During broadcasts and steaming of games, it’s common to see in-game statistical projections on-screen — what are the chances of this hitter striking out, or hitting a home run, for instance.

During the seventh inning of Game 2 Saturday, Fox flashed a projection that there was a 36% chance that Yoshinobu Yamamoto would pitch 9+ innings. (He went the distance.)

The only reason to offer such projections is to feed the appetite for in-game proposition, or “prop,” bets. These are fundamentally bookmakers’ estimates. They don’t tell ordinary viewers anything they need to know to enjoy the coming innings, but do give bettors something to chew on before putting money down on the proposition “will Yamamoto pitch a complete game?”

In-game prop bets, as it happens, are like heroin to the vulnerable, offering instant gratification (or dismay). They “may be associated with risky gambling behavior,” according to the National Council on Problem Gaming. Draftkings heavily promotes prop bets on its sportsbook web page.

In a memo issued Monday, the NBA singled out prop bets as trouble spots: “In particular,” the memo says, “proposition bets on individual player performance involve heightened integrity concerns and require additional scrutiny.”

The major gaming companies have rolled out new ways to keep bettors betting. Smartphone apps, for example. In the old days no one could place a legal sports bet without traveling to Las Vegas, a built-in curb on problem gambling. Today, anyone with a smartphone can place a bet, often without certifying their age or financial resources.

“The advent of smartphones in 2007 and the Supreme Court decision in 2018 opened the door to fully frictionless, 24/7 legal gambling,” problem gambling experts Jonathan D. Cohen and Isaac Rose-Berman wrote recently.

I asked FanDuel and DraftKings if they accepted any responsibility for problem gaming in the U.S. DraftKings didn’t reply. A spokesman for FanDuel told me by email that the company “takes problem gambling seriously and continually works to identify at-risk behavior … including when a customer attempts to deposit significantly more than what they typically do,” or “excessive time on site, chasing losses or signals from customer service interactions.” In those cases, the company sometimes imposes deposit limits or timeouts or can exclude the user entirely.

That brings us to the latest indictments. The feds identified seven NBA games in 2023 and 2024, including the 2023 game in which Rozier allegedly tipped confederates to his decision to bench himself.

Among the others were a 2023 Trail Blazers game in which gamblers were tipped that the team would sit its best players so it would lose, thereby acquiring a better position in the upcoming NBA draft; and two Lakers games in which Jones allegedly tipped gamblers that star LeBron James, a friend since they played together on the Cleveland Cavaliers, was hurt and wouldn’t be playing.

“Get a big bet on Milwaukee tonight,” Jones allegedly told a contact before the first game, against the Milwaukee Bucks. James sat it out and the Lakers lost. James isn’t identified by name in the indictment, but its description of his roles helped identify him. James hasn’t made a public comment about the case, but he hasn’t been accused of any wrongdoing.

Can anything stem this tide? The smart bet at this moment is “no.” There’s just too much money riding on the continued expansion of sports betting: DraftKings has more than doubled its revenue since 2022, reaching $4.8 billion last year, and nearly doubling its monthly average users to 3.7 million. FanDuel is owned by a British gambling conglomerate, so its U.S. sports revenue is difficult to parse.

That’s a lot of money to be thrown around promoting more sports gambling, making it harder for governments to regulate and for sports leagues to turn up their noses at the income. Keeping their image for integrity intact in this world of greedy and needy players and voracious gamblers is only going to get harder.

After the Palisades fire ignited, top brass at the Los Angeles Fire Department were quick to say that they were hampered by broken fire engines and a lack of mechanics to fix them.

If the roughly 40 fire engines that were in the shop had been repaired, they said, the battle against what turned out to be one of the costliest and most destructive disasters in Los Angeles history might have unfolded differently.

Then-Fire Chief Kristin Crowley cited the disabled engines as a reason fire officials didn’t dispatch more personnel to fire-prone areas as the winds escalated, and why they sent home firefighters who showed up to help as the blaze raged out of control. The department, she said, should have had three times as many mechanics.

Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass, right, and Los Angeles Fire Chief Kristin Crowley address the media at a press conference onJan. 11.

(Allen J. Schaben/Los Angeles Times)

But many of the broken engines highlighted by LAFD officials had been out of service for many months or even years — and not necessarily for a lack of mechanics, according to a Times review of engine work orders as of Jan. 3, four days before the fire.

What’s more, the LAFD had dozens of other engines that could have been staffed and deployed in advance of the fire.

Instead, the service records point to a broader problem: the city’s longtime reliance on an aging fleet of engines.

Well over half of the LAFD’s fire engines are due to be replaced. According to an LAFD report presented to the city Fire Commission last month, 127 out of 210 fire engines — 60% — and 29 out of 60 ladder trucks — 48% — are operating beyond their recommended lifespans.

“It just hasn’t been a priority,” said Frank Líma, general secretary treasurer of the International Assn. of Fire Fighters who is also an LAFD captain, adding that frontline rigs are “getting pounded like never before” as the number of 911 calls increases.

That means officials are relying heavily on reserve engines — older vehicles that can be used in emergencies or when regular engines are in the shop. The goal is to use no more than half of those vehicles, but for the last three years, LAFD has used, on average, 80% of the trucks, engines and ambulances in reserve, according to the Fire Commission report.

“That’s indicative of a fleet that’s just getting older,” said Assistant Chief Peter Hsiao, who oversees LAFD’s supply and maintenance division, in an interview with The Times.

“As our fleet gets older, the repairs become more difficult,” Hsiao told the Fire Commission. “We’re now doing things like rebuilding suspensions, rebuilding pump transmissions, rebuilding transmissions, engine overhauls.”

The problem stems from long-term funding challenges, Hsiao said in the interview, with the department receiving varying amounts of money each year that have to be divvied up among competing equipment needs.

“If you extrapolate that over a longer period of time, then you end up in a situation where we are,” he said.

To make matters worse, Hsiao said, the price of new engines and trucks has doubled since the pandemic. Engines that cost $775,000 a few years ago are now pushing $1.5 million — and it takes three years or more to build them, he said.

The number of fire engine manufacturers has also declined.

Recently, the IAFF asked the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to investigate a consolidation in emergency vehicle manufacturers that it said has resulted in skyrocketing costs and “brutal” wait times. In a letter, the IAFF said that at least two dozen companies have been rolled up into just three main manufacturers.

Firefighters battle the Palisades fire on El Medio Avenue on Jan. 7 in Pacific Palisades.

(Brian van der Brug/Los Angeles Times)

“These problems have reduced the readiness of fire departments to respond to emergencies, with dire consequences for public safety,” the letter said.

The IAFF is the parent organization of the United Firefighters of Los Angeles City, the local union representing LAFD firefighters. IAFF has been running the local labor group since suspending its top officers last month over allegations of financial impropriety.

Hsiao said the LAFD’s fleet is well-maintained, and engines don’t often break down.

But the age and condition of the fleet could deteriorate further, even with an infusion of cash to buy new equipment, because the wait times are so long.

Mayor Karen Bass’ office has previously said that she secured $51 million last year to purchase 10 fire engines, five trucks, 20 ambulances and other equipment. The 2025-26 budget passed by the City Council last month includes nearly $68 million for 10 fire engines, four trucks, 10 ambulances and a helicopter, among other equipment, the mayor’s office said.

“The Mayor’s Office is working with new leadership at LAFD to ensure that new vehicles are purchased in a timely manner and put into service,” a spokesperson said in an email.

A majority of the Fire Department’s budget goes toward pay and benefits for its more than 3,700 employees, most of them firefighters.

Members of the Los Angeles Fire Department fill the council chambers to show support for former Fire Chief Kristin Crowley, who was at City Hall March 4 to appeal her termination to the Los Angeles City Council after Mayor Karen Bass fired her as head of the Fire Department. Under the city charter, Crowley would need the support of 10 of the 15 council members to be reinstated as chief.

(Allen J. Schaben/Los Angeles Times)

Despite the city’s financial troubles, firefighters secured four years of pay raises last year through negotiations with Bass. And firefighters often make much more than their base pay, with about 30% of the LAFD’s payroll costs going to overtime, according to the city’s payroll database. Firefighters and fire captains each earned an average of $73,500 in overtime last year, on top of an average base salary of about $140,100, the data show.

Líma said that while new engines will be useful, “a one-year little infusion doesn’t help a systemic problem that’s developed over decades.” Asked whether firefighters would defer raises, he said they “shouldn’t fund the Fire Department off the backs of their salaries.”

The National Fire Protection Assn. recommends that fire engines move to reserve status after 15 years and out of the fleet altogether after 25 years.

But many larger cities need to act sooner, “because of the constant wear and tear city equipment takes,” said Marc Bashoor, a former fire chief who now trains firefighters across the country, in an email. “In my opinion, 10 years is OLD for city apparatus.”

Bashoor also noted that incorporating a variety of brands into a fleet, as the LAFD does, can increase repair times.

“When a fire department doesn’t have a standardized fleet, departments typically are unable to stock enough … parts to fit every brand,” he said in an email. “They then have to find the part or use a 3rd party, which can significantly delay repairs.”

Of the roughly 40 engines in the shop before the Palisades fire, three were built in 1999. Hsiao said engines that old are typically used for training and don’t respond to calls.

Those that are too old or damaged from collisions or fires to ever return to city streets sometimes remain in the yard so they can be stripped for parts or used for training. Some are kept as evidence in lawsuits.

According to the service records reviewed by The Times, a work order was opened in 2023 for a 2003 engine burned in a fire, with notes saying “strip for salvage.” A 2006 engine damaged in an accident was waiting for parts, according to notes associated with a work order from last April. Two 2018 engines were damaged in collisions, including one with “heavy damage” to the rear body that had to be towed in, according to notes for an order from last July. Other orders noted oil leaks or problems with head gaskets.

Almost 30 of the engines that were out of service before the fire — 70% on the list — were 15 or more years old, past what the city considers an appropriate lifespan. Only a dozen had work orders that were three months old or less. That included three newer engines — two built in 2019 and one in 2020 — whose service records showed they were waiting for “warranty” repairs.

After the fire, LAFD union officials echoed Crowley’s fleet maintenance concerns. Freddy Escobar, who was then president of the United Firefighters of Los Angeles City, blamed chronic underfunding.

“The LAFD does not have the funding mechanism to supply enough mechanics and enough money for the parts to repair these engines, the trucks, the ambulances,” Escobar told KTLA-TV.

The issues date back more than a decade. A 2019 report showed that LAFD’s equipment was even more outdated at the time, with 136 of 216 engines, or 63%, due for replacement, as well as 43 of 58 ladder trucks, or 74%. In a report from 2012, LAFD officials said they didn’t have enough mechanics to keep up with the workload.

“Of paramount concern is the Department’s aging and less reliable fleet, a growing backlog of deferred repairs, and increased maintenance expense,” the 2012 report said, adding that mechanics were primarily doing emergency repairs instead of preventative maintenance.

LAFD’s equipment and operations have been under heightened scrutiny since the Palisades fire erupted Jan. 7, destroying thousands of homes and killing 12 people, with many saying that officials were severely unprepared.

A total of 18 firefighters are typically on duty at the two fire stations in the Palisades — Stations 23 and 69 — to respond to emergencies. Only 14 of them are routinely available to fight brush fires, The Times previously reported. The other four are assigned to ambulances at the two stations, although they might help with evacuations or rescues during fires.

The Palisades fire burns along Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu.

(Wally Skalij/Los Angeles Times)

LAFD officials did not pre-deploy any engines to the Palisades ahead of the fire, despite warnings about extreme weather, a Times investigation found. In preparing for the winds, the department staffed only five of more than 40 engines available to supplement the regular firefighting force.

Those working engines could have been pre-positioned in the Palisades and elsewhere, as had been done in the past during similar weather.

Less than two months after the fire, Bass dismissed Crowley, citing the chief’s pre-deployment decisions as one of the reasons.

Bass has rejected the idea that there was any connection between reductions at the department and the city’s response to the wildfires.

Meanwhile, the number of mechanics on the job hasn’t changed much in recent years, fluctuating between 64 and 74 since 2020, according to records released by the LAFD in January. As of this year, the agency had 71 mechanics.

According to its report to the Fire Commission, the LAFD doesn’t have enough mechanics to maintain and repair its fleet, based on the average number of hours the department said it takes to maintain a single vehicle.

Last year, the report said, mechanics completed 31,331 of 32,317 work requests, or 97%. So far this year, they have completed 62%, according to the report.

“With a greater number of mechanics, we can reduce the delays. However, a limited facility size, parts availability, and warranty repairs compound the issue,” LAFD said in an unsigned email.

Special correspondent Paul Pringle contributed to this report.