NEWS

The head of the UN atomic watchdog, Rafael Grossi, told the Security Council that an Israeli strike on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant would cause a nuclear disaster. The Israeli military had said on Thursday that it had struck the facility, but later clarified that the comment had been made in error.

Nikol Pashinyan’s visit marks Ankara and Yerevan’s second attempt at reconciliation.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is on a rare visit to Istanbul to hold talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in what Yerevan has described as a “historic” step towards regional peace.

The visit forms part of the two countries’ efforts to normalise ties strained over historical disputes and Ankara’s alliance with Azerbaijan, which has been in a long-simmering conflict with Armenia.

“This is a historic visit, as it will be the first time a head of the Republic of Armenia visits Turkiye at this level. All regional issues will be discussed,” Armenian parliament speaker Alen Simonyan told reporters on Friday. “The risks of war [with Azerbaijan] are currently minimal, and we must work to neutralise them. Pashinyan’s visit to Turkiye is a step in that direction.”

Pashinyan’s visit comes a day after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held talks in Turkiye with Erdogan, during which he praised the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance as “a significant factor, not only regionally but also globally”, and Erdogan reiterated his support for “the establishment of peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia”.

Baku and Yerevan agreed on the text of a peace deal in March, but Baku has since outlined a host of demands, including changes to Armenia’s constitution, that it wants met before it will sign the document.

Pashinyan is scheduled to meet Erdogan at Istanbul’s Dolmabahce Palace at 15:00 GMT, Erdogan’s office said.

An Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the AFP news agency that the pair will discuss efforts to sign a comprehensive peace treaty.

The regional fallout from the Israel-Iran conflict, which began last Friday when Israel launched several waves of air strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities and military sites, will also be discussed.

Armenia and Turkiye have never established formal diplomatic ties, and their shared border has been closed since 1993.

Attempts at normalisation

Relations between the two nations have been historically strained over the World War I-era mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire – atrocities historians and Yerevan say amount to genocide. Turkiye rejects the label, contending that while many people died in that era, the death toll is inflated and the deaths resulted from civil unrest.

Ankara has also backed its close ally, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, in the long-running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. This region, which had a mostly ethnic Armenian population at the time, broke away from Azerbaijan with support from Armenia in the late 1980s. In 2020, Turkiye backed Azerbaijan in its second war with Armenia, which ended after six weeks with a Russia-brokered peace deal that saw Azerbaijan gain control of a significant part of the region.

Pashinyan has actively sought to normalise relations with both Baku and Ankara.

Ankara and Yerevan appointed special envoys in late 2021 to lead a normalisation process, and resumed commercial flights in 2022 after a two-year pause.

Earlier this year, Pashinyan announced Armenia would halt its campaign for international recognition of the 1915 mass killings of Armenians as genocide – a major concession to Turkiye that sparked widespread criticism at home.

Pashinyan’s first visit to Turkiye was to attend Erdogan’s inauguration in 2023.

This is Ankara and Yerevan’s second attempt at reconciliation. Turkiye and Armenia reached an agreement in 2009 to establish formal relations and open their shared border, but the deal was never ratified because of strong opposition from Azerbaijan.

On May 25, Olorato Mongale, a 30-year-old woman from South Africa, went on a date with a man she had recently met.

Less than two hours later, she was dead.

Her half-naked body was found by the roadside in Lombardy West, a suburb north of Johannesburg. It showed signs of severe trauma and bruising. Investigators concluded that she had been murdered elsewhere and dumped at the scene.

Her brutal and senseless killing led to a wave of grief and outrage on social media. Days later, a family spokesperson revealed that Mongale – a master’s student at the University of the Witwatersrand – had once worked as a journalist. She left the profession seven years ago due to the emotional toll of reporting on gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF).

Her family said Mongale had grown increasingly anxious about her own vulnerability to male violence. In particular, the 2017 murder of 22-year-old Karabo Mokoena haunted her. Mokoena was stabbed to death by her ex-boyfriend, Sandile Mantsoe, who then burned her body beyond recognition and buried the remains in open grassland in Lyndhurst – a suburb just kilometres from where Mongale’s body was found.

Despite her conscious efforts to avoid Mokoena’s fate, Mongale ultimately became what she had feared most: another name added to the long and growing list of South African women murdered by men.

At her funeral on June 1, her mother, Keabetswe Mongale, said her daughter had tried desperately to fight off her attacker.

“When I saw her at the government mortuary, I could see that my daughter fought. She fought until her nails broke,” she said.

Her devastating death serves as a stark reminder that women and girls across South Africa continue to face an existential threat from gender-based violence, despite years of government promises and reforms.

On May 24, 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed into law a bill establishing the National Council on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide. The body is mandated to provide leadership and coordination in the fight against GBVF. While it appeared to be a step forward, it did not represent a transformative policy shift.

This is not the first such initiative. In 2012, then-Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe launched the National Council Against Gender-Based Violence, with a similar mandate to coordinate national anti-GBV efforts.

More than a decade later, with yet another council in place, GBVF crimes continue.

In November 2023, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa released the country’s first national study on GBVF. It found that the persistence of gender-based violence is rooted in “deeply ingrained societal norms and structures that perpetuate male dominance and reinforce gender hierarchies … leading to female subordination, systemic inequalities, and violence against women”.

The destructive effect of entrenched patriarchy is undeniable. In South Africa, a woman is murdered every three hours. That is approximately 8 women a day. One study estimates that around 7.8 million women in the country have experienced physical or sexual violence.

While women of all races and backgrounds are affected, Black women face higher rates of GBVF – an enduring legacy of apartheid and its structural inequalities.

This crisis is not unique to South Africa. The terror faced by women and girls is a continent-wide phenomenon.

In November 2024, the United Nations published its report Femicides in 2023: Global Estimates of Intimate Partner/Family Member Femicides, revealing that Africa had the world’s highest rate of partner-related femicide that year.

Kenya stands out for its staggering figures.

Between September 2023 and December 2024, the country recorded more than 7,100 cases of sexual and gender-based violence. These included the murders of at least 100 women by male acquaintances, relatives, or intimate partners in just four months.

Among the victims was Rebecca Cheptegei, a Ugandan Olympian and mother of two, who competed in the marathon at the 2024 Paris Games. On September 5, 2024, she died in Eldoret, Kenya, from severe burns after her former partner doused her in petrol and set her alight during a domestic dispute. He himself later died in a hospital from his injuries.

The Kenyan government later recognised GBVF as the most pressing security challenge facing the country — a belated but crucial move.

On May 26, Kenya’s National Gender and Equality Commission noted that the surge in GBVF crimes was driven by “a complex interplay of cultural, social, economic, and legal factors”. Patriarchal traditions continue to fuel inequality and legitimise violence, while harmful practices such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation (FGM), and dowry-related violence further endanger women’s lives. Economic hardship and women’s financial dependence only deepen their vulnerability.

Across the continent, we are witnessing a dangerous resurgence of archaic patriarchal norms.

The COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020 further exposed the scale of the crisis. Since then, countless behavioural change campaigns have been launched, but they have largely failed.

This is no surprise.

According to Afrobarometer data from November 2023, nearly 48 percent of all Africans believe domestic violence is a private matter, not a criminal offence.

The uncomfortable truth is that many African men, regardless of education or economic status, do not prioritise the safety or rights of women and girls.

On International Women’s Day last year, South African rugby captain Siya Kolisi said it plainly: “Men are not doing enough.”

Indeed, many continue to uphold harmful customs such as child marriage and remain disengaged from efforts to protect women. Years of empty rhetoric have led to a growing body count.

It is time for African men to take full ownership of this crisis and commit to radical change.

They must reject cultural practices and ideals of manhood that dehumanise women. African cultures are not unchangeable, and patriarchy is not destiny. A new, egalitarian model of African masculinity must be nurtured — one based on dignity, equality, and nonviolence.

This cultural reorientation must begin in families and be sustained through schools, religious and traditional forums, and community life.

It must happen for Olarato Mongale. For Rebecca Cheptegei. For the thousands of others whose lives were stolen.

And most urgently, it must happen for the women and girls across Africa who live each day knowing that their greatest threat may come from the men closest to them.

There can be no just African future unless African manhood is transformed.

Pro-Palestinian activists have broken into RAF Brize Norton and sprayed two military planes with red paint in a major security breach.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has condemned the action as “disgraceful”, saying that it was an “act of vandalism”.

Footage posted online by Palestine Action on Friday showed two people inside the Oxfordshire airbase in darkness, with one riding on a scooter up to an Airbus Voyager and spraying paint into its jet engine.

The Ministry of Defence, which has also condemned the move, is now expected to conduct a review of security at UK military bases. It is working with Thames Valley Police, which is leading the investigation.

Palestine Action said the activists evaded security and claimed they had put the air-to-air refuelling tankers “out of service”.

However, RAF engineers are assessing the damage and a defence source told the BBC they did not expect the incident to affect operations.

In a statement, a Palestine Action spokesperson said: “Despite publicly condemning the Israeli government, Britain continues to send military cargo, fly spy planes over Gaza and refuel US and Israeli fighter jets.”

RAF Brize Norton serves as the hub for UK strategic air transport and refuelling, including flights to RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. The air force has conducted reconnaissance flights over Gaza out of the Cyprus base.

The base is encircled by a large perimeter fence, with security camera and sensors in the area in addition to manned security checkpoints. Patrols around the base are also carried out from time to time.

But a defence source said these measures would not have been able to provide complete cover around the large airbase.

Palestine Action has engaged in similar activity since the start of the current war in Gaza, predominantly targeting arms companies. In May, it claimed responsibility for the daubing of a US military plane in Ireland.

The group said the activists who entered RAF Brize Norton used repurposed fire extinguishers to spray red paint into the planes’ engines.

It also said they caused “further damage” using crowbars – though this is not visible in the bodycam footage it provided.

Video shows the activists then roaming around the airbase.

The protesters did not spray paint on the Vespina aircraft – used by the prime minister for international travel – which was also on the base.

The MoD told the BBC that RAF Voyager aircraft had not been involved in refuelling or supporting Israeli Air Force jets.

A spokesman said Voyagers have been used in the Middle East to refuel RAF Typhoon jets involved in the ongoing international efforts to tackle the so-called Islamic State in eastern Iraq and Syria.

They have also been used in operations in the Red Sea in the past in operations against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Thames Valley Police confirmed it had received a report about people gaining access to the base and causing criminal damage.

“Inquiries are ongoing to locate and arrest those responsible,” the force said.

Lord West, Labour minister for UK security and former head of the Royal Navy, said earlier that while he was not aware of the full details, the break-in was “extremely worrying”.

“We can’t allow thing like this to happen at all,” he told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, adding that breaches like it were “really a problem” for national security.

Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch said the security breach was “deeply concerning”.

“This is not lawful protest, it is politically motivated criminality,” she said in a statement.

“We must stop tolerating terrorist or extremist groups that seek to undermine our society.”

Shadow armed forces minister Mark Francois told the BBC any attempt to interfere with the engines of large aircraft was “totally reprehensible”.

He added there were “serious questions for the MoD to answer” about how protesters were able to “gain access to what is supposed to be a secure RAF airbase”.

The local Liberal Democrat MP Charlie Maynard described the activists’ actions as “stupid and dangerous”.

He said the investigations should establish “how this happened and what can be done in future to make sure no further breaches occur”.

In the digital age, where power dynamics are increasingly defined by information flows and algorithmic influence, cyberspace has evolved from a mere technical domain into a fully fledged geopolitical arena. As Thomas Rid has argued, cyberwar is not a rupture but an extension of politics by other means, characterized by ambiguity, plausible deniability, and the absence of clear thresholds. In this new order, cybersecurity acts as an adaptive shield, protecting vital systems, while cyber defense becomes the digital sword, mobilizing state capabilities to detect, neutralize, and retaliate. This strategic pairing gives rise to an integrated doctrine, where every firewall becomes a sensor and every breach an opportunity for strategic hardening.

Thus, twenty-first-century conflicts no longer begin with declarations of war but with lines of malicious code. State-sponsored cyberattacks, technological espionage, and mass disinformation campaigns are the weapons of the future: silent yet potentially paralyzing. In this shadow war, financial systems, smart grids, healthcare infrastructures, and state institutions become critical pressure points, exposed to systemic shocks that can dislocate national continuity. In response, digital resilience is no longer a defensive posture but a vital imperative. It rests on the fusion of preventive cybersecurity and active cyber defense, forming an invisible architecture that balances anticipation with response. Partnerships like the one between Microsoft and U.S. Cyber Command, where Azure Sentinel’s AI bolsters offensive operations against Chinese APTs, illustrate the hybridization of technological shield and geopolitical weapon. Yet attribution remains a strategic Achilles’ heel; opacity and decentralization of attacks hamper deterrence logic.

For these reasons and inspired by nuclear doctrines, some states are now developing cyber deterrence strategies based on denial (making the attack ineffective) and targeted retaliation (imposing dissuasive costs). The U.S. Cyber Command’s “persistent engagement” model exemplifies this approach, where anticipation, calibrated response, and cognitive dominance form a triptych of integrated deterrence. On the other hand, the rise of artificial intelligence is disrupting this balance at dizzying speed. China’s DeepSeek R1, for instance, demonstrates that AI is no longer merely a tool for data processing but an autonomous force capable of identifying threats, executing countermeasures, and even making tactical decisions. This signals the emergence of a new form of algorithmic sovereignty, where strategic initiative shifts from human to calculated agency.

This paradigm shift is reshaping the military domain as well. Autonomous drones, automated intelligence platforms, and smart weapons systems are redefining doctrines of technological supremacy. Ukraine’s “Spider Web” operation marked a doctrinal rupture, deploying swarms of AI-coordinated micro-drones capable of dynamic, adaptive targeting in cluttered environments. It heralds the advent of fluid, decentralized warfare and prefigures future algorithmic conflicts.

Big Tech: Geopolitical Hydras

When Big Tech dictates the rules of cyberspace, states become variables in someone else’s equation. It is no longer armies but platforms that shape power balances. This paradigm shift cements the rise of an extraterritorial technological power not based on monopoly of legitimate violence but on mastery of data flows and digital architectures. Then, GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) now operates as systemic entities, wielding influence that eclipses traditional state sovereignty. Their power, driven by an unprecedented concentration of computational, financial, and informational capital, grants them a structuring role in international relations, rivaling even the core prerogatives of the state.

This rise isn’t merely economic or technological; it redefines global governance. These corporations act as the architects of the “matrix politica,” enforcing opaque algorithmic regulation of public discourse, social behaviors, and collective perception. By replacing legitimate legal norms with proprietary logic, they institute an unelected algorithmic order, generating “invisible prisons” where individuals become exploitable variables and national sovereignty becomes a residual fiction.

In this context, any viable cyber defense or deterrence strategy must confront this structural asymmetry. Strengthening state defenses against conventional cyber threats is no longer sufficient. The relationship between public authority and private technological hegemony must be recalibrated. Effective digital resilience demands a democratic reconquest of communication infrastructures and political oversight of the normative power wielded by platforms. Absent such rebalancing, cyberspace will continue to slide into a deterritorialized algorithmic sovereignty that deeply reconfigures the exercise of power in the 21st century.

This silent capture of normative power presents a strategic challenge to cyber deterrence doctrines. After all, what is the purpose of state deterrence if critical infrastructures, codebases, and mass cognitive systems are controlled by transnational private entities? Digital sovereignty must encompass offensive capabilities against state-backed cyber aggressors and against hegemonic drifts of platforms capable of reshaping cognitive battlegrounds, manipulating public perception, and influencing political decisions in real time.

This revolution comes at a cost. Deep learning algorithms can now launch sophisticated cyberattacks, detect invisible vulnerabilities, and strike without warning, pushing human intervention into the background. AI thus generates a strategic paradox: it enhances resilience while simultaneously magnifying vulnerabilities. Advances like DeepMind’s AlphaFold show how such technologies permeate critical domains, from biology to cybersecurity, blurring the lines between scientific progress and digital militarization. In this new era, AI is no longer a tool; it is a geopolitical actor.

In fact, major powers and actors are investing in this revolution in different ways. The United States, a pioneer in AI research, focuses on innovation and developing offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. China, aiming for technological supremacy by 2030, is coupling digital sovereignty with state surveillance to bolster its global position. The European Union adopts a more regulatory and ethical approach, seeking to govern AI use while preserving its technological autonomy.

Warfare in the Age of AI

The military domain, too, is being swept into the vortex of AI-led automation. Autonomous drones, smart weapon systems, and automated intelligence platforms are reshaping defense doctrines, ushering in a new form of technological supremacy. These tools offer asymmetric advantages to well-equipped powers but also pave the way for an unprecedented militarization of cyberspace.

Delegating lethal decisions to machines raises profound ethical dilemmas: who bears responsibility for algorithmic misfires? How do we regulate autonomous weapons in a world where legal norms lag behind innovation? Without clear answers, AI risks transforming the battlefield into a dehumanized theater of operations beyond political and moral control.

Subsequently, the proliferation of hybrid threats, cyberattacks, disinformation, and covert operations underscores the urgency of enhanced international cooperation. In fact, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted cyberspace’s centrality in modern warfare, with the rise of cyber-volunteers, hacktivists, and destabilization campaigns. Ukraine’s IT Army exemplifies a new form of cyber mobility, where citizens and transnational collectives become key players in cyber conflict.

In this regard, Ukraine’s “Spider Web” operation against Russian targets demonstrates a new military application of AI in hybrid warfare. Here, AI no longer acts as a mere optimizer but as a digital war commander, orchestrating data collection, target identification, battlefield navigation, and dynamic strike execution. This machine-learning-powered architecture transforms each drone into both a sensor and a lethal vector, capable of real-time adaptation. More than a technological feat, Spider Web signals a metamorphosis of warfare, with AI assuming operational control and ushering in an era of autonomous algorithmic wars.

Fragmented Tech Ecosystems and Strategic Rivalries

Meanwhile, the militarization of cyberspace is accelerating. Leading powers are developing advanced cyber weapons, espionage tools, and surveillance systems to maintain digital supremacy. China’s “Made in China 2025” strategy channels massive investment into cybersecurity and tech sovereignty, while the U.S. doubles down on proactive defense to safeguard its hegemonic edge.

This trend drives increasing fragmentation of the global digital landscape, undermining the ideal of an open internet and encouraging the formation of rival digital blocs. The Sino-American tech rivalry extends beyond infrastructure development, despite enduring interdependencies in key sectors. While semiconductor and 5G decoupling advances, shared reliance persists in AI, cloud computing, and components. This duality complicates strategic choices. Each power must navigate between tech independence and global innovation access, accelerating cyber-nationalism and deepening digital polarization. Huawei’s Harmony OS and U.S. bans on Chinese semiconductors are clear signs of a growing digital decoupling that could redefine global tech ecosystems.

In this climate of intensifying threats and systemic interdependence, states are turning to cyber sovereignty strategies to secure critical infrastructure and reduce exposure to foreign interference. This forms part of a broader reconfiguration of global digital order, where control over data and information flows becomes a strategic lever.

International bodies such as NATO and the EU are gradually adapting. The EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRTs) and NATO’s adoption of offensive cyber doctrines signal a growing intent to pool resources and establish collective response mechanisms. Thus, China exemplifies the sovereigntist approach: its Great Firewall symbolizes a strategy combining national infrastructure protection, strict data regulation, and bolstered cyber-offensive capabilities.

From Code to Context: Redefining Cyberwarfare

Cyberwarfare is no longer about code but about context. Victory lies in merging civilian neural networks, predictive algorithms, and bio-neural systems, where every smartphone becomes a sensor and every hacktivist a cognitive disruptor. Tomorrow’s cyber defense rests on algorithmic sovereignty: an ecosystem where tactical metaverses, morphic AI drones, and quantum blockchains redefine resilience. In addition, Ukraine has shown that the future belongs to those who break hierarchies to build combat bio-networks—info-centric systems powered by quantum geolocation and operational proliferation of cyber volunteers. In this borderless arena, victory is won not by hacking machines but by hacking perceptions, hybridizing human agency, generative AI, and legal ambiguity.

Furthermore, cybersecurity is no longer a static defense line but a fractal weapon with evolutionary capabilities, where every intrusion becomes a counter-weapon and every psychokinetic attack an information battleground. That’s to say, this next-gen cyber architecture is based on adaptive algorithmic systems capable of dynamic reconfiguration in the face of ever-mutating threats. Its strength lies in an advanced synergy of AI, quantum cryptography, and autonomous protocols—modular, decentralized, and self-replicating systems that respond proportionately to the intensity and nature of cyberattacks. In a world shaped by asymmetry and uncertainty, this model grants states algorithmic superiority, shaping tomorrow’s deterrence and digital resilience.

Therefore, in the face of this accelerating tech revolution, global AI governance is no longer optional—it’s an existential necessity. Without robust legal frameworks and multilateral oversight, the world risks plunging into a digital arms race defined by opacity, irresponsibility, and strategic instability. It is no longer about regulating innovation; it is about preserving global balance in a world where the boundaries between war and peace, civil and military, and human and machine are increasingly blurred. Namely, an international architecture of trust and transparency is essential to prevent AI from becoming the unaccountable arbiter of tomorrow’s conflicts.

Disruption Scenario: Toward Unchecked Algorithmic Warfare

By 2032, the lack of international regulation on military AI triggers an uncontrolled rise of autonomous weapons and AI-powered cyber capabilities. Amid mounting tensions between the West and the Sino-Russian bloc, the race for AI military supremacy enters a tipping point. China, after scaling up AI militarization with Central Asian partners, unleashes targeted cyberattacks against European logistics and energy systems, paralyzing large parts of the continent. Simultaneously, autonomous drone swarms developed under a Sino-Russian program infiltrate NATO airspace disguised as meteorological probes.

Behind the scenes, Russia orchestrates a massive cognitive warfare operation using generative AI trained to manipulate Western public opinion. Deepfakes, forged documents, and fake military orders—Europe’s political systems are plunged into information chaos. In several capitals, key decisions are based on alerts fabricated by hostile AI. Thus, a devastating strike then hits a NATO logistics hub in the Baltic Sea, causing significant casualties. No state claims responsibility, but suspicion falls on Russia. Western attribution systems, despite being AI-enhanced, are circumvented by adversarial AI obfuscation networks. Indeed, caught in a spiral of disinformation and decision paralysis, a NATO member launches a massive cyber counterattack on Russian civilian infrastructure. Moscow retaliates with a hybrid strike combining autonomous weapons, electronic warfare, and satellite disruption. Within a week, a high-intensity hybrid conflict erupts regionally, with immediate nuclear escalation risk. Traditional command chains are disabled, decisions are made under AI pressure, and human agency vanishes. Strategic equilibrium, once upheld by nuclear deterrence and diplomacy, collapses under the weight of self-evolving, autonomous algorithms.

Moreover, conflicts no longer begin with declarations of war: they emerge, self-perpetuate, and unfold in an algorithmic fog where the line between peace and hostility vanishes. Humanity then realizes that, in failing to regulate, it has surrendered control to hostile, elusive, and autonomous intelligences.

Coding Sovereignty in the Algorithmic Fog

The future of cybersecurity lies in the ability of states to reconcile innovation, regulation, and strategic cooperation. The implementation of robust cyber doctrines, blending deterrence, algorithmic resilience, and control over critical infrastructure, will be key to preserving national sovereignty and global stability. That is to say, in the age of information supremacy, building cyber coalitions, massively investing in sovereign digital infrastructures, and establishing binding international norms are essential to secure peace and security. Cybersecurity is no longer a defensive tool; it is a core pillar of state power.

This indicates that cyberwar is no longer a future scenario; it is a strategic reality where supremacy depends on integrating offensive and defensive capabilities into a deterrent cyber ecosystem. The convergence of cyber intelligence, algorithmic resilience, and anticipatory response is reshaping defense doctrines, establishing a digital sovereignty rooted in system self-learning, cognitive warfare, and adversary vulnerability exploitation.

Finally, in this asymmetrical theatre, mastery over critical infrastructure and the ability to conduct hybrid operations will determine the balance of power in a cyberspace that has become the epicenter of global strategic rivalries. In the algorithmic fog of tomorrow’s wars, sovereignty is no longer declared, but it is coded, learned, and defended with every line of data.

President Donald Trump hails decision as ‘big win’, but Governor Gavin Newsom promises to pursue legal challenge.

A United States appeals court has ruled the administration of President Donald Trump could keep control of National Guard troops in Los Angeles, over the objections of California Governor Gavin Newsom.

The decision on Thursday comes against a backdrop of heightened tensions in California’s largest city, which has become ground zero of Trump’s immigration crackdown across the US.

In a 38-page unanimous ruling, a three-judge panel said Trump was within his rights earlier this month when he ordered 4,000 members of the National Guard into service for 60 days to “protect federal personnel performing federal functions and to protect federal property”.

“Affording appropriate deference to the President’s determination, we conclude that he likely acted within his authority in federalising the National Guard,” the panel of the San Francisco-based 9th US Circuit Court of Appeal said.

Trump, a Republican, had appointed two of the judges on the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel while his Democratic predecessor, Joe Biden, had named the third, according to US media reports.

Last week, a lower court judge had ordered Trump to return control of the California National Guard to Newsom, saying the president’s decision to deploy them during protests over federal immigration detentions in Los Angeles was “illegal”. That decision by US District Judge Charles Breyer on June 12 prompted the appeal.

On Thursday night, Trump hailed the appeal court’s decision in a post on his Truth Social social media platform, calling it a “BIG WIN”.

“All over the United States, if our Cities, and our people, need protection, we are the ones to give it to them should State and Local Police be unable, for whatever reason, to get the job done,” Trump wrote.

‘Not a king’

The state of California had argued that Trump’s order was illegal because it did not follow the procedure of being issued through the governor.

It was the first time since 1965 that a US president deployed the National Guard over the wishes of a state governor.

The judges said Trump’s “failure to issue the federalisation order directly ‘through’ the Governor of California does not limit his otherwise lawful authority to call up the National Guard”.

But they said the panel disagreed with the defendant’s primary argument that the president’s decision to federalise members of the California National Guard “is completely insulated from judicial review”.

“Nothing in our decision addresses the nature of the activities in which the federalized National Guard may engage,” it wrote in its opinion.

Newsom could still challenge the use of the National Guard and Marines under other laws, including the bar on using troops in domestic law enforcement, it added.

The governor could raise those issues at a court hearing on Friday in front of Breyer, it also said.

In a social media post after the decision, Newsom promised to pursue his challenge.

“Donald Trump is not a king and not above the law,” he wrote.

“Tonight, the court rightly rejected Trump’s claim that he can do whatever he wants with the National Guard and not have to explain himself to a court.

“We will not let this authoritarian use of military soldiers against citizens go unchecked.”

Iran has re-emerged at the centre of international attention, following Israeli attacks on the Middle East’s second-largest country on June 13.

Stretching from the Caspian Sea in the north to the Gulf of Oman in the south, Iran’s landscape is as varied as its history, with key access to critical waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil flows.

Iran’s history spans millennia, making it one of the world’s most ancient and culturally rich nations, continuously inhabited and influential throughout history.

In this visual explainer, Al Jazeera provides a snapshot of Iran’s geography, key cities, population makeup, and ethnic diversity.

Iran at a glance

With a population of 92 million, Iran is the 17th-largest country in the world by population and land area.

Iran’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) is $418bn, ranking it 36th in terms of the economy size. It has an unemployment rate of about 7.2 percent.

The country’s adult literacy rate is 89 percent, with youth literacy nearing 99 percent, though these rates vary between rural and urban areas.

The country is rich in oil and gas, ranking as the world’s ninth-largest oil producer and third-largest natural gas producer.

How big is Iran?

Located in Western Asia, Iran is the second-largest country in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and the 17th-largest in the world, covering approximately 1.65 million square kilometres (636,000 square miles).

Iran shares land borders with seven countries, the longest being Iraq, followed by Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkiye and Armenia.

Iran covers about one-sixth the equivalent land area of the United States, nearly as large as the state of Alaska.

It is about one-sixth the size of Europe, about one-fifth the size of Australia, roughly half the size of India and about 80 times larger than Israel.

Where are Iran’s main population centres?

Most of Iran’s 92 million people live in the western half of the country, where the terrain features rugged mountains alongside fertile valleys and river basins that sustain much of the population.

With 9.6 million inhabitants, Tehran has been the capital since 1795 and is the country’s largest city. Situated beneath the Alborz Mountains, Tehran’s history dates back more than 6,000 years.

Mashhad, in the northeast, is Iran’s second-largest city with 3.4 million people and a history spanning more than 1,200 years. It is a major religious and cultural centre and is home to the Imam Reza Shrine, which brings in millions of pilgrims from around the world.

Isfahan, the third-largest city, is home to some 2.3 million people. More than 2,500 years old, the city was once the capital of the Safavid Empire, which lasted from 1501 to 1722. Isfahan hosts major educational institutions and is a centre for textiles, steel and manufacturing, along with nuclear and aerospace industries.

Other populous cities across Iran include: Shiraz (1.7 million), Tabriz (1.7 million), Karaj (1.6 million), Qom (1.4 million) and Ahvaz (1.3 million).

Demographic breakdown

Nearly 60 percent of Iran’s population is below the age of 39, according to figures from the United Nations Statistics Division.

The country’s median age is 33-34 years, and about 77 percent of Iranians live in urban areas.

The largest age groups in Iran are those aged 30-34 and 35-39, meaning most of the population was born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Pahlavi Shah regime.

However, there has been a significant emigration of Iranian professionals in recent years, largely driven by economic hardship.

What are Iran’s ethnicities?

Iran is a highly diverse country, both ethnically and culturally. Persians make up approximately 61 percent of the population, while significant minority groups include Azerbaijanis (16 percent), Kurds (10 percent) and others, such as Lurs (6 percent), Arabs (2 percent), Baloch (2 percent) and Turkic groups (2 percent).

Iran is predominantly Shia Muslim, making up about 90 percent of the population, while Sunni Muslims and other Muslim sects account for roughly 9 percent. The remaining 1 percent includes roughly 300,000 Baha’i, 300,000 Christians, 35,000 Zoroastrians, 20,000 Jews, and 10,000 Sabean Mandeans according to the Minority Rights Group.

In border regions such as Kurdistan, Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan, ethnic groups play a key role in shaping the country’s ethnic and religious diversity as well as its regional politics.

While Persian (Farsi) is the official national language, many regions across the country speak a variety of other languages.

The 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, held in late May 2025 in Singapore, continued to clearly reflect the escalating strategic tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Mutual criticism of freedom of navigation, militarization of the South China Sea, and the “rules-based” international order created an atmosphere of near-confrontation.

In that context, Vietnam—a country with a strategic position and close relations with both the United States and China—has once again attracted the attention of international analysts as a potential model of the “soft balancing” strategy. The question is, can Vietnam continue to maintain an independent and autonomous foreign policy while the great powers are increasingly exerting pressure?

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 reaffirmed America’s “unwavering” commitment to the security of its allies and partners in Asia, with a particular emphasis on “freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” and opposition to “unilateral actions that change the status quo.” Hegseth also announced the expansion of defense cooperation with many Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.

In turn, China has criticized the United States for using the Shangri-La Dialogue to “create disputes, sow discord, provoke confrontation, and pursue selfish interests,” after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called China a threat in the Indo-Pacific region.

The war of words between the United States and China at Shangri-La 22 not only reflects the stance of the two powers but also an effort to shape the understanding of regional security, leaving countries like Vietnam facing many difficult choices.

Since 2023, when upgrading relations with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” Vietnam has entered a new phase in its policy of “multilateralization and diversification” of international relations. Bilateral trade turnover between Vietnam and the US has exceeded the 124 billion USD mark in 2024, while the US has also actively promoted cooperation in technology, cybersecurity, and maritime patrol support.

However, China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with total two-way trade reaching a peak of over 230 billion USD in 2023. In addition, China is also an important source of input materials in many manufacturing and processing sectors.

Geostrategically, Vietnam is caught between two increasingly clear poles of influence. Leaning too heavily toward one side not only violates Hanoi’s principle of independent and autonomous diplomacy but also carries the risk of being drawn into conflicts that are not its own.

Vietnam’s “four no’s” defense policy—no participation in military alliances; no alliance with one country against another; no allowing foreign countries to set up military bases; No use of force or threat of use of force—continues to be affirmed after Shangri-La.

However, the challenge lies in practical implementation in the context of the US increasing its military presence in the East Sea, while China continues to consolidate artificial outposts and increase its maritime law enforcement forces.

Vietnam has been strengthening its defense capabilities, but it is not seeking a rigid alliance. Its defense procurement from multiple sources (Russia, Israel, South Korea, India, etc.) reflects its desire to maintain a flexible neutrality. In addition, Vietnam prioritizes bilateral and multilateral defense dialogues—including the ADMM+ and the ASEAN Maritime Security Capacity Building Initiative—to maintain regional stability.

For many experts, Vietnam is currently one of the few ASEAN countries with the capacity and courage to maintain a “dual pivot ”strategy”—maintaining warm relations with the US while maintaining stability with China. After the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam will continue to play an active role in maintaining the stability of the regional power structure. By raising its voice, it will strengthen ASEAN’s central role, from the East Sea issue to building military-security dialogue mechanisms.

However, it cannot be denied that the increasing strategic pressure from both sides may hurt Vietnam’s independent policy space, especially when some countries in the region have begun to lean heavily towards one side; for example, the Philippines has increased military exercises and signed many extensive military agreements with the US.

Vietnam needs to continue moving in the direction of “not choosing sides, but choosing interests.” This means prioritizing substantive projects: energy transition, green technology, improving maritime security capacity, and responding to climate change.

Equally important is to promote bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels to resolve disagreements, especially the East Sea issue. In the context of the Code of Conduct (COC) still not reaching consensus after nearly two decades of negotiations, Vietnam’s proactive mediating role in ASEAN is extremely necessary.

Finally, Vietnam needs to invest more heavily in its domestic “strategic analytical capacity” and foreign policy advisory apparatus to provide flexible, realistic options and respond promptly to strategic movements in the region.

Thus, after the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, although no solution to regional security conflicts emerged, it was a clear reminder that US-China competition will continue, even more fiercely. In that environment, Vietnam has no other choice but to uphold the principles of independence, self-reliance, and cooperation while strengthening internal strength, expanding partnerships, and firmly maintaining a principled stance.

It is not an easy road. But as history has shown, Vietnam’s sobriety and steadfastness in the midst of major strategic currents is the foundation for long-term stability and development.

US President Donald Trump has made his administration “a subcontractor, a junior partner” to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives in the Middle East, argues Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen.

As the president mulls further involvement in Israel’s attack on Iran, Senator Van Hollen tells host Steve Clemons that “This notion that you can just drop a few big bombs and be done with it misunderstands history, because there is a real risk that the United States will get dragged deeper and deeper into this war.”

Van Hollen also criticised the US-Israeli Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as “death traps” for Palestinians.

Israel has bombed the northern Iranian city of Rasht, causing a massive fireball to rise through the night sky, not long after it sent out a warning for people to evacuate the area. One of the strikes reportedly hit the Sefidrood Industrial park.

Washington, DC – Over the past week, United States President Donald Trump has been issuing statements on Iran that appear to be contradictory.

He has called for ending the war and hinted at peace coming “soon”, only to then suggest that assassinating Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could be an option for the US along with joining Israel’s bombing campaign.

In the latest turn, the White House said on Thursday that Trump will make a decision on whether to join the war within two weeks.

These changes in the president’s stance have some observers thinking that Trump may not have a clear strategy or endgame; rather he is being dragged to war by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been seeking US attacks on Iran for decades.

Alternatively, could Trump be using his increasingly bellicose rhetoric against Iran to compel Tehran to agree to entirely give up its nuclear programme?

If so, experts warn that brinkmanship could turn into an all-out war between the US and Iran.

Jamal Abdi, president of the National Iranian American Council, said Trump could be attempting to build leverage with threats to strongarm Iran into accepting his demands of “total surrender”.

“I think he’s trying to present himself as this madman who is unpredictable, and in so doing, he can then insist on this very hard line that Iran has refused to accept for decades of full dismantlement of its enrichment programme,” Abdi told Al Jazeera.

Another possible explanation of Trump’s latest statements, Abdi added, is that he is “being taken for a ride by Bibi Netanyahu to commit the United States to a full-on war with Iran”.

‘He says one thing. He does another’

Iranian American analyst Negar Mortazavi also said that Trump is being “outmaneuvered” by Netanyahu.

“I don’t even know if President Trump knows what he wants,” Mortazavi told Al Jazeera.

“He campaigned as the president of peace … he promised he’s going to end conflicts. Russia-Ukraine hasn’t ended. Gaza has escalated, and he just let the third big Middle East war – which looks like a regime-change war – start under his watch. So, he says one thing. He does another.”

Israel launched its bombing campaign against Iran last week, two days before US and Iranian officials were set to meet for a sixth round of talks in Oman.

Hours before the Israeli assault began, Trump renewed his commitment to diplomacy. And the initial US response to the Israeli strikes was to stress that Washington is not involved in the attacks.

In subsequent days, however, Trump appeared to take credit for the Israeli bombing campaign.

“We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” he wrote in a social media post on Tuesday, without elaborating on who the “we” was.

“Iran had good sky trackers and other defensive equipment, and plenty of it, but it doesn’t compare to American made, conceived, and manufactured ‘stuff.’ Nobody does it better than the good ol’ USA.”

Israel’s strikes have targeted Iran’s air defences, military and nuclear facilities, oil infrastructure and residential buildings, killing hundreds of people, including top military and political officials as well as many civilians. Iran has responded with hundreds of ballistic missiles that have killed at least 24 Israelis and left widespread destruction across the country.

Israeli officials claim they are trying to destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, but also note that their military campaign could lead to the collapse of the Iranian governing system, which they say would be a welcome development.

However, it is widely believed that Israel would need US help to destroy Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, Fordow, which is buried inside a mountain.

Mortazavi said war hawks and Israeli officials appear to be making the case to Trump that bombing Fordow will be an easy task.

“Instead of a regime change war – a devastating, unnecessary war with Iran, which he has been warning everyone and running against in his campaigns, they’re just making this look like, ‘Oh, you just use your bunker busters once and done.’”

But Iran has promised to retaliate harshly against any US attack.

Thousands of US troops in the region could come under Iranian missile strikes. If the war escalates, Iran could also disrupt shipping lanes in the Gulf – a major lifeline for global energy.

Iranian lawmakers have already suggested that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz that connects the Gulf to the Indian Ocean and through which 20 percent of the world’s oil flows.

‘Catastrophic’ war

Mortazavi said escalating the conflict will have “catastrophic” consequences for the region.

“It will look like Iraq and Afghanistan combined, if not worse. Iran is a big country,” she said.

In Iraq, Bush’s regime-change war led to years of sectarian bloodshed and the rise of groups like ISIL (ISIS). In Afghanistan, US forces fought for 20 years after deposing the Taliban from the capital Kabul, only to see the group swiftly return to power as US troops withdrew.

Even if Iran’s governing system is toppled under US and Israeli blows, experts warn that US war hawks should be careful what they wish for.

Iran is a country of more than 90 million people. The fall of the government could lead to internal conflict, displacement crises and regional – if not global – instability, analysts say.

“This is not a colour revolution. This is going to be war and chaos, potentially civil war, and unrest,” Mortazavi said.

Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of the rights group DAWN, said that even if Trump is trying to gain leverage with his threats and is not seeking war or regime change in Iran, it’s a risky strategy.

“The possibilities of the assaults on Iran escalating into not just a broader regional war, but potentially a global war, are extremely high,” Whitson told Al Jazeera.

“And so, continued belligerence and hostile rhetoric from President Trump is only throwing fuel on the fire.”

Getty Images

‘At risk of avoidable harm’

MARTIN MCQUADE / BBC

South Asia, a crucible of ancient civilizations and modern rivalries, stands at a perilous crossroads. For over two decades, Michael Kugelman, a leading American foreign policy expert and Director of the South Asia Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, has meticulously charted its volatile course. His insights reveal a region increasingly caught between the existential dread of nuclear arsenals and the explosive forces of populist narratives and fervent nationalism. The recent, harrowing crisis between India and Pakistan in May 2025 – a conflict that saw missile strikes, drone warfare, and an almost immediate breakdown of a US-backed ceasefire – serves as a chilling testament to these escalating dynamics.

Kugelman’s analysis begins with a foundational, yet often overlooked, truth: South Asia’s inherent fragmentation. “This is a region where you have many countries that simply struggle to get along,” he observes, pointing beyond the omnipresent India-Pakistan antagonism to include fraught relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India’s recurring disputes with its smaller neighbors. Borders, everywhere, are a flashpoint – disputed, porous, or simply volatile.

This chronic discord found its sharpest expression in the May 2025 conflagration. Following a brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” a series of missile strikes deep inside Pakistan. Islamabad retaliated with “Operation Bunyaan al Marsoos,” deploying its own ballistic missiles and engaging in an unprecedented drone duel. Kugelman notes how quickly the Line of Control (LoC), which had enjoyed a four-year truce, ignited. “Once again, now the LoC is extremely tense and particularly significant, given that you’ve got two nuclear states there,” he underscores, highlighting the hair-trigger nature of this enduring fault line.

The ascent of populist and nationalist politics, particularly in India, has fundamentally altered the calculus of nuclear deterrence, making escalation both more probable and profoundly less predictable. Kugelman argues that the current Indian government has shrewdly harnessed a hardline stance on Pakistan for domestic political gain. The 2019 crisis, unfolding on the cusp of Indian elections, saw New Delhi launch airstrikes beyond Pakistan-administered Kashmir for the first time since 1971. “I think that one could argue that the Indian decision to take the steps that it did… was in some ways driven by considerations about politics,” Kugelman explains.

This phenomenon is not unilateral. Domestic political agendas in both nations frequently weaponize cross-border tensions. Even if the strident rhetoric from nationalist media in India is partly performative, “that still has an impact on how the public, the broader public, looks at and perceives Pakistan.” This creates immense public pressure, demanding forceful retaliation for any perceived slight or attack, as demonstrated by the furious public outcry after the Pahalgam incident in May 2025. “There’s going to be significant amounts of pressure from the public on the government in India… it was very clear that India was going to respond with force,” Kugelman states, emphasizing how deeply public sentiment now intertwines with strategic decisions.

Fuelling this volatile public sentiment is a media landscape saturated with jingoism and, often, outright disinformation. While English-language nationalist channels capture global attention, the broader media sphere across South Asia consistently ratchets up hyper-sensationalism during crises. “It can be very dangerous,” Kugelman warns, “Because… the jingoism also encourages and at times propagates disinformation. And, you know, that in and of itself is very dangerous.” He directly connects this trend to recent conflicts, stating, “on the Indian side, so much of the jingoistic media content was accompanied by disinformation. I mean, oftentimes it was synonymous.” In an age where narratives can be manufactured and amplified at warp speed, this weaponized information environment makes rational de-escalation a monumental challenge.

The rise of cyber warfare, hybrid threats, and widespread disinformation campaigns raises critical questions about the efficacy of traditional nuclear doctrines. While governments are undeniably engaging in these new forms of conflict, Kugelman asserts that they do not diminish the paramount importance of maintaining nuclear preparedness. Both India and Pakistan have shown a disturbing willingness to employ conventional force increasingly, pushing closer to the nuclear threshold. “The more that you use, the higher up the escalation ladder you get,” he cautions, “and the higher you get up, you get closer to bumping up against the ceiling.”

Disinformation, by inflaming passions and deepening animosity, can dangerously accelerate this ascent. Kugelman suggests that these new dimensions of warfare, far from supplanting nuclear concerns, in fact amplify them. “One could argue… cyber warfare disinformation can deepen tensions between two countries that are nuclear and raise the risk, further raise the risk of nuclear escalation.” Compounding this is the ongoing internal debate in India regarding its stated No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear policy, with past statements from senior officials hinting at a potential reconsideration – a move that could further erode predictability in an already volatile environment.

China’s expanding military and economic influence casts an undeniable shadow over South Asia’s security dynamics. Despite recent diplomatic efforts between India and China, including a border agreement in late 2024 aimed at easing tensions, the core strategic competition persists. The May 2025 crisis vividly demonstrated the enduring strength of the China-Pakistan alliance, with Pakistan deploying Chinese-made jets against India for the first time in combat. Kugelman emphasizes that China remains Pakistan’s most critical arms supplier, capable of providing weapons systems that no other partner can match, especially as the U.S. continues to restrict Pakistan’s use of American-made weaponry against India.

China’s economic reach, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is region-wide. While Kugelman notes a general slowdown in some BRI projects due to security concerns and economic issues – a trend confirmed by recent reports showing a significant drop in CPEC investment – China’s economic influence remains formidable. “This is really just something consistent that’s been playing out for some time,” he states, highlighting Beijing’s deep, steady penetration into the region, reshaping its strategic calculus.

Amidst these rising pressures, the question of strategic stability looms large. Kugelman offers a cautiously optimistic assessment: “the nuclear deterrent is actually alive and well.” While the May 2025 conflict tested the deterrent in ways not seen since the massive border buildup of 2001-2002, both sides ultimately demonstrated a shared desire to avoid an all-out war. “Neither side wanted an all out war,” he stresses, distinguishing governmental intent from jingoistic public rhetoric. India’s rapid, targeted airstrikes and Pakistan’s contained, albeit forceful, response were, in Kugelman’s view, calibrated moves reflecting a continued respect for the nuclear red line. The fact that India and Pakistan largely managed to negotiate their own ceasefire, rather than relying solely on external mediation, further underscores their grim recognition of the catastrophic stakes.

However, this “alive and well” deterrent is perpetually tested. India’s missile strikes, whether depicted as targeting terrorists or military assets, were unequivocally viewed by Pakistan as a violation of sovereignty. “When it comes to conflict… international normative ideals around respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity… they go out the door,” Kugelman starkly reminds us. The very act of such cross-border retaliation, irrespective of nuclear use, chips away at the foundational principles of statehood and international law, keeping the entire region on tenterhooks.

The path to de-escalation and sustained peace talks remains fraught. The Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline, a vital communication channel even during wars, remains open and was utilized during the recent crisis. Beyond this, however, “the two sides just don’t line up when it comes to the issue of dialogue.” India’s unwavering stance against engaging Pakistan until “cross-border terrorism” ceases, combined with its rejection of discussing Pakistan-administered Kashmir, clashes directly with Pakistan’s insistence on Kashmir as a core issue.

Prime Minister Modi’s early attempt at outreach to then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, followed by a terrorist attack, appears to have instilled a “once bitten, twice shy” caution. And while Pakistan publicly calls for talks, it too has conditions. Adding to this grim calculus is the recurring “spoiler act”—often a terrorist attack—that invariably derails any nascent momentum toward dialogue. While India traditionally rejects third-party mediation for comprehensive talks, the May 2025 crisis saw a quiet but significant role played by external actors, with the UAE in particular thanked by Pakistan’s Prime Minister for its efforts in de-escalation, building on its prior role in brokering the LoC truce. This suggests that limited, targeted mediation for specific de-escalation objectives might be the only viable avenue for external engagement.

In a world increasingly consumed by its own inward-looking concerns, the question of who will fill the potential vacuum in South Asian peace looms large. Kugelman offers a sobering answer: “the region is going to be on its own.” While major powers like the U.S., Russia, and China broadly align in their desire to prevent nuclear escalation—a shared concern often rooted in their own vested interests in regional stability—their capacity and willingness for sustained, comprehensive mediation are limited. China, despite its rivalry with India, has massive investments in Pakistan that it cannot afford to see imperiled. Russia seeks new friends amidst its isolation. The U.S. balances critical interests with both India and Pakistan, making broad intervention fraught.

Yet, amidst this potential vacuum, Kugelman identifies a crucial, if understated, role for regional powers with significant leverage. He points specifically to the Arab Gulf states. “They provide significant amounts of energy exports and other goods,” he explains, giving them economic sway. Furthermore, the UAE’s successful role in brokering the LoC truce demonstrates a capacity for targeted, effective mediation. These nations, though not global superpowers, may be best positioned to “suggest incentives for India and Pakistan to ensure that things don’t get completely out of control.”

South Asia, a region of immense human potential, finds itself perpetually walking a razor’s edge. The interplay of nuclear might, emotionally charged narratives, and aggressive nationalism threatens to pull it closer to the abyss. Michael Kugelman’s sharp analysis reminds us that while the nuclear deterrent may still hold, its resilience is being tested as never before, demanding sustained vigilance and creative diplomatic solutions from within and, perhaps, from unexpected corners of the world.

United States President Donald Trump will decide on whether his country will join the Israel-Iran conflict in the next two weeks, the White House has said, amid growing speculation of US involvement and fears of wider escalation.

On Thursday, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters that Trump had shared a message: “Based on the fact that there’s a substantial chance of negotiations that may or may not take place with Iran in the near future, I will make my decision whether or not to go within the next two weeks. That’s a quote directly from President Trump,” she said.

“The president is always interested in a diplomatic solution … he is a peacemaker in chief. He is the peace through strength president. And so if there’s a chance for diplomacy, the president’s always going to grab it. But he’s not afraid to use strength as well,” the press secretary added.

The US described its ally Israel’s initial June 13 strike on Iran as a “unilateral action”. But Trump himself has signalled that he knew of the attack in advance and supported Israel’s military campaign.

At the same time, according to the Reuters news agency, which cited three unnamed diplomats, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff has spoken to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi several times on the phone since Israel began its attacks.

Amid the talk of diplomacy, Tel Aviv and Tehran have continued to trade attacks.

On Thursday, Israel targeted Iran’s Arak heavy water nuclear reactor. Iran, in turn, hit the Soroka Medical Centre, which it claimed was near an Israeli military and intelligence centre.

At the same time, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz threatened to eliminate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Such a person is forbidden to exist,” he said in a statement cited by the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.

‘Camouflaged’ intentions

Over the past few days, Trump has hinted at joining Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, but at the same time has proposed a swift diplomatic solution in a confusing message from Washington.

Following a report by the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday night that Trump had already signed off on striking Iran but had not decided on when they would do it, the president took to his Truth Social social media account to deny the report.

“The Wall Street Journal has No Idea what my thoughts are concerning Iran!” Trump wrote.

But Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst Marwan Bishara said that Leavitt’s comments could well be a ploy, and if so, Trump would be able to use it as a “pretext in order to camouflage whatever his intentions are and attack tomorrow”.

As Araghchi is expected to meet his British, French and German counterparts in Geneva on Friday, along with the European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, to discuss Tehran’s nuclear programme, Bishara said Trump could be waiting to hear the outcome of those talks before making his decision to attack.

“If one has to over-interpret, I would say the following: He’s giving the Europeans some time so that everyone could save face,” Bishara said.

Al Jazeera’s Doha Jabbari, reporting from Doha, said the lack of trust between Tehran and Washington will make it difficult for the Iranians to fully believe Trump is open to diplomacy.

“Assuming that the Israelis have the green light from the Americans to carry out these attacks inside Iran, there is going to be very little trust there,” Jabbari said.

“But really, this is the diplomatic game they have to play,” she added, referring to the upcoming talks in Geneva. “If they [Iran] don’t go, they’re going to be accused of basically saying we’re not going to talk, we just want war. They’re going to have to travel, and the Europeans are acting as a mediator between Iran and the US.”

At the same time, Russia and China have repeatedly warned against the US’s involvement in the conflict and called for a ceasefire.

Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez warns the spending hike would undermine EU efforts to build its own security and defence base.

Spain has reportedly asked to opt out of NATO’s proposed defence spending target of 5 percent of GDP, risking disruption to a key agreement expected at next week’s alliance summit.

In a letter addressed to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Thursday, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez urged the alliance to adopt a more flexible framework, according to media reports.

The letter, seen by the Reuters and Associated Press news agencies, called for either the target to remain optional or for Spain to be exempt entirely.

“Committing to a 5% target would not only be unreasonable, but also counterproductive,” Sanchez wrote, warning that it would undermine efforts by the European Union to build its own security and defence base. “As a sovereign Ally, we choose not to.”

Sanchez insisted Madrid does not intend to block the outcome of the upcoming summit. But any agreement on increased defence spending must be approved unanimously by all 32 NATO members, giving Spain leverage to delay or water down the deal.

Spain currently spends approximately 1.28 percent of its GDP on defence, the lowest among NATO members, according to alliance estimates. While Sanchez has pledged to accelerate the country’s path to NATO’s current 2 percent goal, he argues that going beyond that risks harming the welfare state and compromising Spain’s broader policy vision.

NATO’s push for higher spending follows calls by US President Donald Trump and others to share the burden more fairly across the alliance. Rutte has suggested a new formula that allocates 3.5 percent of GDP to core military spending and an additional 1.5 percent to broader security needs.

Pressure to increase defence spending

The United States, NATO’s largest military contributor and Ukraine’s main backer since Russia’s 2022 invasion, is estimated to have spent 3.38 percent of its GDP on defence in 2024. Trump has repeatedly claimed European allies are not pulling their weight, and has threatened to withhold support for those who fall short.

Sanchez, however, said rushing to meet a 5 percent target would force EU states to buy military equipment from outside the bloc, damaging the continent’s attempts to bolster self-sufficiency in defence.

The proposal also faces resistance from Spain’s political left. The left-leaning Sumar party, part of Sanchez’s coalition, opposes the move, while Podemos, not in government but often a key parliamentary ally, has also rejected it.

“If the government needs parliamentary support to approve spending, it will have a very difficult time in the current situation,” said Josa Miguel Calvillo, a professor of international relations at the Complutense University of Madrid, speaking to Reuters.

Italy has also raised concerns, reportedly seeking to shift the proposed deadline for the new target from 2032 to 2035 and drop the requirement to increase spending by 0.2 percent annually.

One senior European official told Reuters that Spain’s rejection complicates talks but said discussions are ongoing. “It doesn’t look good, indeed, but we are not over yet. Spain has demonstrated to be a steadfast ally so far.”

Lionel Messi hits late winner against Porto to push Inter Miami to verge of qualification at FIFA Club World Cup.

Lionel Messi scored his first goal of the expanded FIFA Club World Cup with an exquisite free kick to inspire Inter Miami to a 2-1 victory over two-time European champions Porto.

The Herons trailed 1-0 at the break, but Telasco Segovia tied it two minutes into the second half off a cross into the box from Marcelo Weigandt.

Then it was time for the 37-year-old Argentinian to add a trademark goal to a resume that already assures he’ll go down as one of the game’s greatest stars.

Samu Omorodion scored on a penalty kick in the opening minutes after a video review for the Portuguese club’s first goal of the tournament.

Both teams were held to scoreless draws in their opening Group A matches.

Inter Miami coach Javier Mascherano praised his side’s performance level against a side regarded as among the elite in Europe.

“We were working really, really hard against a team that have a lot of quality and a high level, but today, we showed to the world and to ourselves that we can compete against any team,” Inter’s Argentinean manager said.

“This match, the first half was very, very good, also. The players understood that they can do it. When we are together, when we are next to our teammates, we can do something amazing.”

Messi was taken down just outside the penalty area by Rodrigo Mora on a run down the middle of the field.

The crowd at Mercedes-Benz Stadium was chanting “Messi!” Messi! Messi!” before his left-footed blast cleared the Porto wall and ripped the net in the top right corner in the 54th minute.

Inter Miami returns to South Florida on Monday, knowing a victory over Brazilian club Palmeiras at Hard Rock Stadium will lock up its spot in the Round of 16.

In desperate need of a win, Porto closes out group play against Egypt’s Al Ahly at MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey.

Labour MP Vicky Foxcroft has resigned as a whip over the government’s plans to cut disability benefits.

In a letter to the prime minister, Foxcroft said she understood the need to address “the ever-increasing welfare bill” but said cuts to personal independence payments and universal credit should “not be part of the solution”.

She said she had “wrestled with whether I should resign or remain in the government and fight for changes from within. Sadly it now seems that we are not going to get the changes I desperately wanted to see.”

Responding to her letter, a government spokesman said it was fixing a “broken welfare system” that was failing the sick and vulnerable.

“Our principled reforms will ensure those who can work should, that those who want to work are properly supported, and that those with the most severe disabilities and health conditions are protected.”

Earlier this week, the government published its bill, which tightens the criteria people have to meet in order to get personal independence payments (Pips) and cuts the sickness-related element of universal credit.

More than 100 Labour MPs have expressed concern about the bill and the government could face a large rebellion from its own backbenchers when it comes to a vote in a fortnight’s time.

On Wednesday, Work and Pensions Secretary Liz Kendall told the BBC her “door was always open” to colleagues worried about the bill but that ministers were “firm in our convictions”.

Under the current system too many people were being “written off” instead of being given support to find work, she said.

She also argued that claimant levels are rising to unsustainable levels, and figures released this Tuesday found the number of people on Pips had reached a record high of 3.7m.

On Wednesday, impact assessments produced by the government estimated that 370,000 existing Pips claimants in England, Wales and Northern Ireland would lose out under the proposed changes, saving £1.7bn by 2029/30.

A further £1.89bn could be saved from a predicted 430,000 drop in the number of potential future claimants.

Another impact assessment, published in March suggested 250,000 people could be pushed into poverty by the cuts – but ministers said the figure didn’t take account of the £1bn it would spend to help the long-term sick and disabled find work.

As a government whip, Foxcroft would have been expected to persuade reluctant Labour MPs to back the proposed legislation.

The Lewisham North MP said she was quitting because she knew she would “not be able to do the job that is required of me and whip – or indeed vote – for reforms which include cuts to disabled people’s finances”.

She added that she was “incredibly proud to have served as part of the first Labour government in 14 years and hope that ministers will revisit these reforms so that I can continue to support the government in delivering for the people of this country”.

Foxcroft was first elected to her south London constituency in May 2015.

Like the other Silicon Valley monopolies, Google habitually takes the side of Israeli occupation and war crimes in Palestine – the very term Palestine is not used by their highly influential maps app.

A new report by a Palestinian human rights group last month exposed the depths of Google’s dedication to the Israeli occupation.

With a known history documented back more than 3,200 years, the name “Palestine” is the only term continuously used for the entire territory of the country lying between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

Palestine is the most historically accurate term. But since 1948, when Zionist militias expelled the majority of the Palestinian population from the country by force, a new state, “Israel”, was established.

That state has never declared its borders.

Consequentially, when speaking about “Israel” it is unclear exactly what territory is being referred to. But Zionists of both the right and the “left” commonly claim the entire historic territory of Palestine as the “Land of Israel.”

The new report, by 7amleh (Hamleh), a Palestinian organisation advocating online rights, details how Google seems to almost go out of its way to eradicate the reality of Palestinian life.

In 2016, Google came under fire from Palestinians on social media when the terms “West Bank” and “Gaza” disappeared from Google Maps. Google said that the removal of these terms was down to a glitch and that they had never used the word Palestine in the first place.

(The West Bank and Gaza Strip are regions of Palestine that are important, since they represent the remaining Palestinian territories which Israel failed to occupy in 1948. In 1967, however, Israel took over those too.)

“Through its mapping and labelling,” the 7amleh report explains, “one can deduce that Google Maps recognises the existence of Israel, with Jerusalem as its capital, but not Palestine.”

There are further aspects of the way Google has wiped Palestinian life off the map though. As the 7amleh report maps in some detail, Palestinian villages in the Naqab (Negev desert) deemed “unrecognised” by Israel (inside of what is sometimes termed “Israel proper” – the territories of Palestine occupied in 1948) are not properly mapped by Google.

These villages are only visible in Google Maps “when zooming in very closely,” the report explains, “but otherwise appear to be non-existent. This means that when looking at Google Maps, these villages appear to be not there.”

The report details how small Israeli villages are “displayed even when zoomed-out, while unrecognised Palestinian Bedouin villages, regardless of their size are only visible when zooming in very closely.”

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This is despite the fact that there “are in total 46 Bedouin villages in the Naqab, the majority of which existed before Israel’s creation in 1948. Some claim to have existed since the 7th century.”

Israel has repeatedly attempted to physically remove these villages, but has repeatedly failed, thanks to the resistance of the Palestinians who live there, and thanks also to national and international solidarity shown to those villages.

Their Israeli (lack of) status as “unrecognised” also means that the state refuses to connect the villages to basic services like water and electricity – despite the fact that nearby Israeli-Jewish settlements are given all the support possible.

As Basma Abu-Qwaider, one Palestinian Naqab villager, explains in the report:

Google Maps acts in a discriminatory manner towards the unrecognised village the same [way] as the Israeli government does. Google ignores the existence of these villages just like Israel and for me if you do not exist on the map it means that you are invisible and that’s exactly what Israel wants us to be.

This solidarity with Israeli racism expressed by Google’s helpful attitude towards Israel’s wiping of Palestinians quite literally off the map extends across the 1967 “Green Line” ceasefire boundary.

Palestinian villages even within the “West Bank” area of the Jordan Valley are not properly mapped by Google either. The report documents that while Israeli settlements “can be seen when looking at the larger area of the map” some Palestinian villages are only visible when zoomed in – and even that only as a result of pressure being put on by a human rights organisation.

Google also refuses to recognise or map the reality of Israel’s apartheid roads system for Palestinians.

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As part of Israel’s ongoing settler-colonisation of Palestine, large parts of the West Bank – which is ruled by Israeli military decree – are prohibited access for Palestinians. Many roads are reserved for the use of Jews only.

Despite the illegality of these practices under international law, Google’s route-planning apps do not designate Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal.

7amleh’s report concludes: “Google Maps, as the largest global mapping and route planning service, has the power to influence global public opinion and therefore bears the responsibility to abide by international human rights standards and to offer a service that reflects the Palestinian reality.”

Google should be compelled to end its complicity with Israeli racism and apartheid.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.