In traditional terms, a political crisis in a neighboring country is often seen as a direct challenge to that country’s national security and regional strategic interests. For most countries around the world, the situation in Nepal following the bloody mass protests, sectarian strife, and successive government crises in recent years seems to have reinforced that perception.
Moreover, Nepal is the southern gateway to Tibet, a pivot country between China and India, and a link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia. Instability here would naturally make Beijing worry about the risk of losing influence, broken investment commitments, or even challenges to border security.
However, this is not necessarily a threat to China, and it can even take advantage of this crisis. This is reflected in the saying “When the world is in chaos, the situation is wonderful”; the power of the ruling party is further consolidated. Former Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong used this argument to explain why he launched the Great Cultural Revolution in the 60s and 70s. If we apply this logic to Nepal today, political instability is not necessarily a risk for China but can become an opportunity to expand its influence, reorder the region, and test its diplomatic capabilities.
Chaos is not always a risk; it can be an opportunity.
Mao looked at the turbulent periods in Chinese history, such as the Five Barbarians and the warlord wars of the early 20th century, and concluded that the collapse of order does not mean the end of opportunities for development. Instability can open up a power vacuum for new forces. Nepal today reflects exactly that.
Faced with a divided political landscape, Nepal’s various parties and factions have sought international support to maintain their positions. This has enabled China to engage more strongly through aid, credit, infrastructure investment, or party-to-party diplomacy, which is Beijing’s strong point. An unstable government is more likely to make concessions in its dealings with international partners, as long as it receives timely recognition and support.
Furthermore, as Nepal’s factions compete for power, they tend to maintain good relations with China so as not to be pushed off the board. This strengthens Beijing’s position in the long term: rather than fearing a loss of influence, China can exploit the divisions to ensure that whoever comes to power will have difficulty “breaking away” from Beijing. In Maoist logic, “great chaos” means an increase in the ability to “divide and rule,” a powerful tool for maintaining lasting influence.
The old order being shaken up will create opportunities to build new influence.
Another key point of Mao’s thesis is that when the old order weakens, the force of stability and abundant resources becomes more prominent and can easily shape the new order. Nepal is in such a situation today. Political parties have taken turns in power but have failed to maintain stability, causing the state apparatus to lose credibility. In this context, China—with its economic potential, ability to deploy aid quickly, and stable position internally—has emerged as an “alternative pillar.”
More importantly, the collapse or restructuring of the Nepalese government does not mean the end of all engagement with China. In fact, the BRI, the trans-Himalayan railway, or energy cooperation can be renegotiated in Beijing’s favor if China offers an attractive package. In a situation where Nepal needs capital and technology to recover, Beijing can completely reshape the rules of the game.
In addition, instability has reduced Nepal’s dependence on India, which is often criticized by the Nepalese people for interfering deeply in domestic politics. As trust in New Delhi declines, strategic space opens up for Beijing. In other words, “great turmoil” in Nepal could be a factor in accelerating the shift in the balance of power in South Asia, tilting further towards China.
Instability is a test of the sustainability of regional strategy.
Mao once asserted, “The more chaos, the easier it is to recognize who is friend and who is foe.” Instability is not only a risk but also an opportunity to classify forces, measure loyalty, and adjust strategy accordingly. With Nepal, China can observe how parties behave in crisis: which factions seek help from Beijing and which side leans towards New Delhi or the West. These signals are real data that help China adjust policies, choose suitable partners, and strengthen the “security net” in the border region.
At the same time, the crisis in Nepal can be seen as a “practice” for China’s crisis diplomacy. Handling Nepal will provide valuable experience for Beijing in the event of instability in Myanmar, Pakistan, or even Central Asia. If handled successfully, China will demonstrate its ability to engage flexibly in the region, both protecting its core interests and avoiding falling into a US-style “quagmire” in the Middle East.
Nepal is in chaos, but China is fine.
The key point in Mao’s thinking is that the issue is not whether the world is in chaos, but whether China is stable internally. Because if it maintains domestic stability, has a strong economic foundation, and has a flexible foreign policy system, then external instability can hardly shake core strategic interests.
Nepal is just one link in China’s overall South Asia and Himalayan subregional strategy. Its spiral of instability does not directly threaten Beijing’s border security or overall power. In fact, the contrast between a stable China and an unstable Nepal reinforces Beijing’s image as a “guarantor of stability” in the region. This has a dual benefit: it both enhances China’s prestige in the eyes of its neighbors and counterbalances the role of India and Western powers.
In fact, China has skillfully used humanitarian diplomacy, such as COVID-19 vaccine support, disaster aid, and infrastructure investment, to demonstrate its role as a “pillar of stability.” In the chaotic Nepalese context, this image is even more prominent. Beijing does not need to worry too much about short-term losses; instead, it can exploit the instability to assert its long-term position.
Viewed through a conventional realist lens, the political crisis in Nepal inevitably poses many risks for China, from lost investment to instability on the border. But if we apply Mao Zedong’s thinking about “great chaos,” where chaos is a prerequisite for a new order, then Nepal now represents an opportunity for Beijing to increase its engagement, consolidate its influence, and test its regional strategy. The key is not whether Nepal is in chaos, but whether China can maintain internal stability and exploit the gaps of the times. In this logic, Nepal’s instability does not cause China to lose sleep; on the contrary, it could become a catalyst for Beijing to consolidate its power and influence in the Himalayan subregion.